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THE DI?10MATIC RELATIONS BETWEEN CHINA
AND JAPAif

)

SINCE

RUSSO-JAPAl.ESE

WAR.

"

HITROmJCTION.

The relations between China and Ja
pan vn a political or diplomatic sense are only of modern
origin. During long centuries the dealings between these
two countries were very unimportant, if not non-existent.
Nippon, in the first instance. had bOl-rowed from the Middle
Kingdom her literature, her arts, her fashions and her phil
osophies. Thus the kimono is only the Chinese dress of the
Tang Dynasty

(l~.D. 618-907'.

The written characters of Japan

have the stiffness and squareness of a writing in vogue ages
ago in China. The glorious colorings of the pottery and lac
quer of the Ming period are models for Japanese art, and the
philosophies of Japan are those of t he great Chinese oommen
tators of Confuoius. In a word the

p~ople

of the Island Em

pire developed their peeuliar' civilization by borrowing all
the models and ideals from China which they

est~c~ed

good

and worthy.
The first real oonfliot between the two ooun
tries was when

Hideyosh~

ordered the invasion of Korea at

the close of the sixteenth century. Ming armies crossed the
Yalu carrying succor to a vassal state; but they were
able to avert the ruin which overtook the peninsula

n~t

owir~

to the frightfUl nature of the fighting between the Japanese
and Koreans. The Chino-Japanese

,a~. 1~

1895 was the next

forward move in the Japanese polioy of agr:reasion. Success
in this war brought to Nippon the realization that she must

2.

become a manufacturing country, and play the same part
to the Asiatio mainland that England had played in the
past to Continental Europe. Aoomrneroial

trea~~

was

made between China and Japan; Manohuria was "disoovered";
inoreasing quantities of ootton weJ'e reoeived from the
Yantsze basin; and great quant1ties of bean.s from Korea
and the Three Eastern Provinces made their way to-Japan.
It was not until the late Russo-Japanese \Var
that the relations between China and Japan inoreased in
politioal importanoe and signifioanoe. It has wrought a
great effeot upon tbe affairs in the Far East, and thus
inaugurated a

n~w

era in the history of China-Japanese

relations. In order to understand the aims of Japan in
her -relations wi th China it is- necessary
place, to investigate the

I

in the first

fundamental oauses and issues

underlying the ti tanio struggle waged between Russi-s, and
Japan, to seek tu understand how the Russian advance to
the Pacifjo had oome in oonfliot with Japan's ambjtion 
to estab)5sh a hegemony in the

j~ar

East, and to investj,",

gate what she has acqUired as a result of her viotory in
the struggle.

?A.-r..T I.
RUSSO~JAPANESE WAR

Chapter i--·---Causes of the war.
Chapter 2------What the war conferred upon
Japan in China.

PART I
RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR.

Chapter I.
CAUSES OF THE WAR.
For Japan the issues at stake appear to be
mainly economical in their nature, because of her immense
growth of population t her commercial and induBtrial devel
opment, and her need of raw material for manufactures due
to her slow progress in agriculture. IL other words she
needs Ilan increased importation of raw materials and food
I

stuffs and an increased exportation of manufactures".

Th€re~

fore the conclusion seeDS to be that in case the markets of
East Asia be closed the growing populati.on of the Island
Empire would be deprived of food, and consequently its nat
~

2

ional liIe would be paralyzed. These markets then must be
left open. Thh: necessitates the maintenance of' the ;jOpen
Door" principle in China on the part of Japan, and the main
tenance of this principle invOlves the preservation of ter
ritorial integrity of China; because

i~

case of its dismem

berment the powers would exercise politjcal and commercial
influence 1.n the regions acquired by them to the economic
disadvantage of Japan.
The interests of Russia appear to be political
and strategical rather than economic in nature, and there
fore considered less vital than those of Japan. It is said

4.

that Russia''''produces what she consumes a.nd consumes
3

what she produces". In North China the Mikado and the
Czar both seek trade and colonization, the difference be
ing, as claimed by Japan, that she insists upon the prin
ciple of the open door while Russia whose policy is highly
aggressive, opposes it.
Russia's foreign policy is the result of de
velopment since the days of

~eter

the Great who, being con

cerned with the future expansion of his country, was ser
iously impressed with the need of access to the sea. Russia
produces one fourth of the world's supply of wheat. It is
said that ofteD-times millions of bushels of Russian grain
lay useless while grain in other parts of the world sold for
one dollar

~

and half or more a bushel. This apparently is

due to the lack of an outlet or an ice free port. Such, if
acquired,would mean not only the access of wheat to the
world's

m~rkets,

but above all, it would mean an open avenue

for arms, ammunitions, and other military supplies that
wheat will pay for.
In her efforts to

csca~e

from the perrenial

grip of ice a.nd snow Russia has tried to "obtain access to
the sea in four directions, viz; ( I
Black Sea,

( 3)

the

~ersian

j

the Baltic, ( 2) the

Gulf. and (4) the Pacific Ocean.

Her desire for the control of the Baltic Sea has been

but

partially realized, owing to the rivalty of England, Germany

and Sweden". Then she turned her attention to the Black
Sea, but her attempts to control Constantinople as a means
of dispossessing the Turks of their traditional hold upon
the "passageway of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles from the
Black Sea to the !.1edi terranean II was nu11i fied by the powers
of Western Europe, especially Great Britain, who

~

also

restrained her from obtaining a foothold on the Persian Gulf.
Finally her "Warm Water Policy" led Russia to center her .=!f
forts of aggression in the Far East, and there she was whipp
ed by the Japanese.
The hostility between Japan and Russia dates
as faa back as 1790 when the vessels of the latter first ap
peared in the Japanese waters. In 1798 the Russians attempt
ed in vain tp take the Kuri1e Island from Japan; but in 1806
they succeeded in placing under their control the northern
portion of the Island of Sagha1ien. These events aroused
bi tter hatred of the Japanese against Russta. a.nd the Japan
ese.writers appealed vigorously to their brethren to defend
their country against the I'Wild Eagle of the North ff. In
1862 and 1867 Russia dealt afresh with Japan in respect to
Sagha1ien,and in preventing herself from following an agress
ive policy during the first few years after the revolution
of 1868. which revolution

resulted in the e1imim tion of

feudalism and the reforma.tion of its institutions,., Japan
adopted what was known as the "policy of concession".

6.

Consequently by the Treaty of 1874 she ceded to Russia the
entire Island of Sagha11en, full of potential wealth, in
exchange for

t~e

5

sterile Kuriles.

Despite this oession made by the Japanese, Russia
was still extending her oonquest toward the Far East. This
~B¥

be aocounted for by the faot that after the disastrous

Crimean war Russia wished to take her revenge in Asia, for
in Far Eastern dtplomaoy, she deolareQ, the European powers
6

oould not oompete with her. that

Asia seemed to be the line

of least resistence to the realization of her dream of sea

,

coasts and harbors not bound by ioe; that the sucoess of
Count Nioholas 1iuravieff in repelling the allied squadron
of

i~anoe

and Great Brita±n with a Russian fleet by way of

P.mur during the Crimean war convinced the Russian bureau
cracy of the absolute importance of Amur River to the in
terEsts of Russia; and that"the domination of Saghalien had
8

whetted the appetite of the Russian Government."

Of course there were obstacles lying in the way
of the realization of this grandjose policy. 'rlhile the gov
ernment was actively at work with suoh end in view the

0001

heads of St. Petersburg were not slow to point out the ooming
jealousy.· anQ opposition of Japan and other powers interested
in the Far East. The

advooat~s

of the forward policy declar

ed that the powers of Western Europe oould not keep paoe
with Russia in Far Eastern diplomacy. and the whole question
might be settled by giVing them a few crumbs of the bread.
•

7.

As for Japan she was not worth the finger-bone of a Russ

ian grenadier, and all her boasted progress was nothing more
than a thin veneer of European civilization. As the 110scow
patriots on the eve of the Crimean war sajd contemptpus1y of
the allies, "We have only to throw our hats at them", so
now the believers in Russia's historic mission in the Far
East spoke of their future opponents as "monke:rsll and "par
rots If.~
~he

~

beginning of Russia's systematic advance

to the ?acific via Sjberia, dating as far back as 1857,
resulted in the conclusion of the. Aigun Treaty with China
10

(May, 1858). By this treaty the left bank of Amur and the
right bank below the confluence of the Ussuri were conced
ed to Russia. China was then at war with England and Franoe.
and Russia quickly offered to act as mediator between China
and the

Ang10~French

a11jes. Thus while having won the favor

of the Chinese Government she had secured the "Treaty of

••

Pekin, 1860". by

whi1.~h

she was given in addition to the

region on the left bank of the !rour River all the territory
between Ussuri and the Eastern Sea (or Sea of Japan). Russia
has obtained

po~session

of the

!~ari tine

Province in a more

temperate region than she had as yet occupied, and in 1861.
had founded

oh the Gulf of Peter the Great the nava! sta

tion V1adwostok, now connected by rail with Chita in Trans
baika1ia and Khabarosk, the capital of the Amur Region. The
acquisition of this sea-port had not by any means put an

..

end to Russia's scheme of teritorial aggrandizement, for
altho the gUlf on which it stands never freezes, a thin
layer of ice orust always forms along the shores in Dec
ember and remains until April. Besides, Vladivostok has
not and will never have a well develope~hinterland.
After a period of inactivity (1875-1890)
the Russian Home Government had learned with complete thor
oughness tile Far Eastern conditions thru "the visit of
the/Czarevitch" in that part of the globe in 1891, which
~

led

her to realize the importance of southern conquest of

the Far East while Japan was only in a state of emergency.
She immediately commenced such conquest by bUildi.ng the
Trans-Siberian Railway. The irritation of the Japanese
had already reached its climax because of the fact that
Nicholas II was then travelling, in Japan primarily to
~l

study her from a strategic standpoint. Three years later
a war broke

out between China and Japan, and its unex

pected outcome brought about the Treaty of Shimonoseki,
13

April 17, 1895, which stipulated that China should cede
to Japan (1) the Liao-tung Peninsula - a southern prolong
ation of

~anchuria

jutting

~nto

the Yellow Sea, together

with Port Arthur and valmy, (2)Formosa. the valuable camphor
producing island and the

~escadores,

(3) that China shoud

pay a large indemnity of 200,000,000 taels, and above all,
(4) she should grant Korea absolute independence. This
afforded Russia an

•

opportunity

of ingratiatng herself

with China. Acceding to Li Hung Chang's appeal for interven
tion, she at once

pers~~ded

Germany and France to join in a

concert to protest against Japan's contemplated occupatjon of
Liao-tung. The three cabinets in a spirit of cordial friend
ship for Japan, recommended to the government at Tokio that
the seizure of the important strategical position would con
stitute a jeapordy of the peace of East Asia and would be a
1+
constant threat to the territorial integrity of China. During
the process of negotiatj.ons RUEsia even went so far as to prepare
for mobjlization against Japan who, enfeebled by her conflict
with China, withdrew froTh the mainland for fin additional indem
nity of 30,000,000 taels (thus making an indemnity of 230,000,
000 taels) and

a convention between the belligerents was sign

ed at Pekin on November 8, 1895, for the retrocession of Liao
tung. Russia even considered it advantageous to assist China
to pay her war indemnity by issuing a 4% loan of 400,000,000
francs at Paris July, 1895, p&yable in thirty-six years, which
was intended to cover at least one half of the

indemnjt~T.

Ever since Russia's initiative in dispossessing
Japan of a foothold of the Asiatic mainland preparation for re
venge became a religious duty of the Japanese. She had seen the
Si berian Rai lV/ay extend.ed to the :!lanchurjan border; had viewed
with alarL1 the conGtruction of the Chinese Eastern Railway
across I'.1.anchuria to

j

ts southern-most limi ts~-~

gibcrian Rail'li&Ir ext8ndea t-G

~

i:aangj,m:r jan bord8'F;

&€-eft

h8.d

t-fle

~itnessed,

as it were in a

night, the rise of the Rus

sian towns and the establishments of Russian emigrants

in

that vast region; had stood by while the minernl resources
and commercial advantages of one of the richest territor
ies i.n China passed into the hands of Russia; had observed
the conversion of Vladivostok, Port Arthur and

Dal~T

into

modern fortresses; the increase in the number of Russian
warships until they constituted the most imposing fleet
of any nat:t0n i'epresented in Pacifi c

wat(~rs;

and the ar

rival of arms, ammunition and men in large numbers. All at
once the arsenals and magaZines of the whole ·empire echoed
with Ilfeverish

militar~,T

preparations" for the" life- and..,.

death struggle which, ·as every Japanese statesman saw it,
would surely come. It was said that Japan barely had a
breathing space, because the corning conflict was not for
revenee alone, but also for future expansion as a World
Power.
The loan.of 1896 which was intended to relieve
China from the enormous indemnity exacted by Japan, brought
Russia into close fjnancial relations with China. Her next
step therefore, was to facilitate the execution of the
loan, and to more definitely comnect the Russian and Chin
ese financial and commercial interests. Such beine the end
in view there was extablished between Pekin ani

St~

Peters

burg the so-cafled Russo-Chinese Bank which in reality was

11.

intended to promote Russian

co~~ercialand

political

d~signs\~

Lastern Asia. The agreement was concluded in September, 1896,
prrrlid1ng for the connection of the Trans-baikal and South
IS

Ussuri lines by bUilding a railway thru :'!i£.nchurtB. It also
provided for the organization of

th~

Chinese Eastern Railway

Company under the management of a board whose nominel head
was the Chinese minister at St. Petersburg. but whose real
head, the vice president, was under the

supervis~on

of the

Russian minister of finance. The general terms of the agree
ment were "that the shareho Iders should be Rusehl.D£ and

Chin~

ese only; that the railway should be begun within twelve
months and completed within f1ix years; that, on the expiretion
of eighty years from the completion.. of the line, t1:.e railway,
together with all its property, should pass without payment
to the Chinese government, which waR not to be held responsi
ble for any losses which the company might sustain during

th~t

period; and that the Chinese government was to have this right,
at the

expiration of thirty-six years from its inauguration,

to take over the railway on due payment to conclude the actual
cost thereof, together with all interest thereon". In view of
the fact that there was a Luge marauding populati on in the
region thnl which the projected railroads were to run the a
greernent also provideo. ror the"protection of t he laborers am
works. Thus under the disguise of policing the lands Rm,sia
introduced an army of occupation. Again the agreement stipu
lated tha.t "during the

,',

eig:l~iY

years of

RUSE;

ian management

li.1 •

•
all cOJ!l.. .n odi ties carri ed betwe en Chi na and

Ru:~;sia

by the

ra~1

way should pay 1.n China duties one third less than the ordi
nary import and export duties in that empire"."
Naturally. Russia did not help Chine for

nothi~·.

The road to \lladivoslok via Manchuria was now open (1896). We
have seen that Vladivostok is not ice-free the whole year
round. and Russia had longed to carry out her flwarm water policy
ever since the reign of ?eter the Great. In March of 1898 anopportunity presented itself. Germany had secured from China
a

~9-year

lease of the port of Kiao-Chao, which Russia had

earmarked for hersel:f, together with the exlusive rights of
exploiting
vileges of

the potential wealth of Shangtung and the pri

.,

railways in that province", as an

buildin~

inde~-

nity for the murder of" two German missioners spies by a Chin
ese mob in the preceding year. Russie at once made a plea to
China,

de~andjng

a lease of

~ort

as a

set-off against the loss of Kiao-Chao

Arthur which was to be open only to the Chin

ese and Russian waretdps. and.

D~ln;:l

whj_ch on the other hand,

was to be an open port excepting that portion used for naval
~

purposes, China, bei.ng in a state of military unpreparedness
reluctantly granted such lease on March 27. 1898. This Vias
immediately fall oVled

b~T

Wei-hai-wei at -uhe mouth

the Bri ti sh reques t for t he lease of
It

()f

Gulf of Pe-chi-li •. and by the

French lease of Kwang-chau-Jau under the disguise of restor
ing the "balance of

power~1

in the

f 1ar

East.

The grandiose scheme of Russia was carefully

laid, and for e time it was

~

favored by circumstances. In 1900

the "Boxer Uprising" broke out in North China; and Russia, a
vailing herself of this opportuni ty. dispatched

6.

large force

to Manchuria, and even seized the treaty port of Niuchwang,
placing it under her own civil administration. It seemed, for
a moment, as if the policy of "pacific infiltration" which she
had pursued for several generations m!ight be supplanted by an
"expedi tiou8 mode of annexation". On August 14, 1900 Groderkoff,
the Governor-General of the Amur province, wrote to his home
government saying,

'1

f1 fty years ago the

RU~;s ian

flag was ra.is ed

at the mouth of the Amur, on its right bank, and laid the foun
dation 01 our possessions on that great river. Now, after hard
fighting, we have taken possession of the right bank, thus con
solidating the great enterprize of annexing the whole of the
Amur to EU8flia's

domin~ons,

and making that river an internal

waterway amd not a frontter stream, whereby free and unmolested
navigation of that artery thru one of thp. vastest regions of
l'!l

the Empire has been secured."
So dexterous was the diplomacy of Eussia. that, as
...

a meanetof appeaetng the diplomutic world, she at once dispatch
ed u circular mote to the Worldls Great Powers on mlgust 28,
1900, announcing the military occup8tion of Manchuria had been

only dictated by the necessity of checking the advance of the
~

China rebels, and she would not fail to withdraw her troops
from the terri tory if [;t:h.e action of· other lowers docs not place
any; obstacle in the way ot· auch a measure ,; ~o

A.

force of 12,000 Russian railway guards was

sent to protect the Manchurian railways; trcops withdrawn from
Pekjn were sent to limnchuria; and a large naval force was eent
to strengthe:'L her own poe i ti on on the .Paci fj c. Then in th€l
11

"Alexieff-Tseng Agreement concluded in November

of the saMe

year Russia cla:i.med. thtit China shonld comply wi th

ti.~e

fallowing

demands before she would be allowed. to resume the civi 1 govern
rnent of Fengtien.

(1)

thc_t she should disband the

Ch~

nese sOld-·

iers and hand over the war ammunitions to the Russians; (2)that
all fortifications at Fengtien other than those occupied by the
liussians should be irnnediately dismantled; (3) that order and
peace 8hould be maintained by the local civil authoritjes;
"that, in case of emergency; the Chinese

~overnrr.ent

\4.)

was to apply

for additional reinforcement from Ru~',s ia a1 one ~\
This agreenent, tho not ratified, astonished the
whole circle of great powers, anti. at the same time China owing
to her military

unpreparedne~s

sought to resist the pressure by

appealing to the rival powers. This led Great Britain, the
uni ted states, Germany and eE"pecia.lly Japan to make strong pro
test at

~ekin.

But the St. PetErsburg Government continuously

insisted that ChinE. meet

her demands, in spite

01"

her repeated

assurances that t:lO mili tary occupation in southern Y;.s..nchuria
wao only terlporary in its nature, and that its ob.i ect was sim
ply to pacify the disturbances in the vicin1ty of the Eussian
frontier and no"1i a.t all rn.ingled ;vith any int€·rested motives. In

15.

,the agreement between Count .L.andorff and

Ycmg-Yll t ]'ebruary -

1901) it was further provided that tn addition to the terms
lq.id out in tl:e

>

.Uexieff-Tseng Agreement 11 t he number of thE'

mounted o,no. foot police 1;\hich China was to orge.nize should be
fixed bJT Russia; that China should not conced.e mining, rai 1way ,
and other privileges to another Power without the

~onsent

of

St. Petersburg in countries adjoining Russia, i.e. Manchuria,
Mongolia, Tarbogati, IIi, Kashg&r, Yarkond, and Kloten; that
China should not her3elf construct a railway in those
without Russia's consent; th&t if she wanted to

count~ies

eml)lp~-

foreign

subjects to discipline the soldiers in .Jorth Chlna she should
employ

~hose

of Eussian nationality; and that no territory in

Manchuria besides Nuichwang be leased to any other power or
az..
powers" •
It was, of

course~difficult

for a nation so peace

.loving as China to rema.iil. firm without any tangible and moral
support of other powers. Upon her appeal to the friendly states
(or I would rather say superficial friends) Japan and Great
Britain protested vigonously against the conclusion of such
agreement on the ground that such an act was contrary to the
principle of solidarity whicn then unlted the Powers, and an
individual convention with one Power would materially lesson
the capacity of China to meet her obligation toward &il the
Powers". As a result China

refused to sign the con,/ention even

in a modified form, add Russia declared that
of

~ilanchuria

t~e

evacuation

could only be accomplished after the affairs in

16,•.

China had been restored to their normal state.
The negotiations had only been suspended for a
time. Early in October M. Lessar. the then Russian ambassador
at

~ekin,

prepared another oonvention conoerning the question
~

of Manchuria. in which Russia proposed the following: The
Empire of Russia "agreed to evacuate Manchuria in

three yearB~

if there are no repetitions of disorder, and the conduct of
other nations does not hamper; that the Agreement of April, 18
1899. with the Russo-Chinese Bank be adhered to; that China
~nde~take

to protect the railways and Russ1an subjects in

churia, for which purpose mounted and foot soldj ers (the
bers to be determined

b~

~&an
n~l:1

egreement with Russia) mjght be stat

ioned in lands other than thoue assigned to the Railway Compani,
provided that the use of artjllery be exclu1ed and that the
troops of no ther

n~tionality

be employed; that SUbjEcts of no

other nationality be permitted without the consent of Russia to
build railwa,ls or bridfes in southern

~.lIanchur1.an.

Besides.

another proposal was added about J&nuary, 1902. which insisted
that China herself exploit

n~nchuria

and develop the industries

therein. In case of financial eXirency application for loan
should under any ctrcUIDstances be made to the

RU:Jso-Chinese

Bank; and if the latter should for any reason dec11ne to tender
such assistance she might be permttted to make similiar appli
cation to other :Powers:~s
The real

~otives

of Russia in connect10n With

these demands can be easily seen. She sought to obtain the

the exclusive right of bUilding railways, and the exploita
tion of natural resources in

~anchuria.

This effort was vtew

ed with great concern by other Powers vitally interested in
the cownercial and industrial enterprises in China. A react10n
at once followed. Straining every nerve to resist RUBsials
gaining influence too near its shore Japan lined up with Eng
land and the United States and vigorously protested aga1nst
these demands. :.1r. John Hay, then Secretary of Sta te

of the

United States, reminded Russia of the principle of the "open
door

ll

,

and that such agreement constituted a breach of the

treaty stipulations concluded between China and

the Powers.

Al:f a result of' this protest Russia ceased to press China \vi th
these demands, and promptly accepted the counterproposals made
by the latter lApril 8. 1902) in which she agreed to withdraw
all her forces from wi thin the limits of Manchuria.'Z.: rl'his was
primarily due to the conclusion of the Alliance between Great
Britain and JOapan at London, Janurary 30,

190~.

The treaty of

Al11ance, Which was defensive in i.ts nature, expressly stuted
that the High Contracting Parties, anx10us to maintain the
sta~

~

in the Far East, mutually recognized the territor

ial integrity of China and Korea. They declared themselves to
be entirely uninfluenced by any aggressive tendencies in either
country, and that it would be admissable for either of them to
take such measures as might be indispensable

i

i~order

to safe

guard their 'tnterestG if threatened by the aggressive action
.of any other Power, or by disturbances arj sing in China and

Korea. 1f either Great rlritain or Japan, in the defense of
their respective jntere$ts as above

dEscri~ed,

should become

involved in war with another Power, "the other H.igh Contract
ing .i!a.rty ';7ill mainte:i n a strict neutrali ty a.nd use its efforts
to prevent other Powers from joining in

hostilit~e8

agajnst its

ally; and if in the abOve event any other Power or Powers should
join in hostilities against that ally, the other High Contract
ing Parties will come to jts assistance, and will conduct war
in common, and will make peace in mutual agreement with
This agreement was. as a

mut~;er

it".~l

of fact, the outcome of the

events which had taken place during the past two years in the
Far East and of the part taken by both England and Japan in.
dealing with them.

It

was actuated by the similiar views of the

tViTO contracting parties, and existed, according to Dr. Asakawa.
"for the purpose

0 .:..

effectively safe-guarding t he interests ac

qUired by the two Powers on the common ground Ttl!
The conclusion of the

Anglo-Ja~anese

Alliance was

qUickly followed by the .Agreement between China and Russia re
specting Manchuria (signed at rekin,
of the agreement may be better

11arah 26, 1902). The terms

set forth by quoting the exact

words of the document itself which reads as folloWS;l~
"His Majesty the Emperor and Autocrat of all
the Russius.and His

~"1ajesty

the Emperor of China, wit:n the great

object of re-establishing and confirming the relati on of good
neighborhood, which were disturbed by the rising jn the Celes
tial Empire of the year 1900, have appointed their Plenipoten
,.
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.

tiaries to come to an agreement on certain questions relating
to Manchuria. These Plenipotentiaries, furnishea with full
powers, which were found to be in order, agreed as fOllows:
ARTICLE I.
His Imperial

~~jesty

the Emperor of

Russi~,

desirous of

giving fresh proof of his peaceable and friendly disposition to
ward His Maj esty the Emperor

0

f China. and over looking the fact

that attacks were first made :rom frontier, posts in tmnchuria on
peaceable

Huss ian Settlements, agI"eeS to the re-establishment

of the authori ty,:pf' Chinese government in that region, which re
mains an,! integral part

l~

of the Chinese empire, and restores

to the Chinese government the right to exercise therein govern
mentll and administrative authority. as it existed previous to
the occupation by Russian troops of that region.
ARTICLE II.
In taking possession of the governmental and administrative
au thori ty in !l1anchuria, tile Chinese government confirms, both
wi th regard to the period and wi tl-. regard to all other Articl es.
the obligation to observe strictly the stipUlations of the Con
tract concluded with the Russo-Chinese Bank on t he 27th Augus t,
1896, and in virtue of paragraph 5 of t he above tienti oned Con
tract. takes upon itself
protect the

rail~ay

the obligation to use all means to

and the persons in its employ, and binds

itself also to secu.re wi thi.n the boundaries of Manchuria the

.
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safet) of all Russian subjects jn general and the undertakin£s
established by them.
The Russian Government, in view of these obliga
tions accepted by the Government of His r1ajesty the Emperor of
China,

agr~es

on its side, provided that no disturbances arise

and that the action of other Powers shou-Jd. not prevatl, to
withdraw gradually all its forces from within the 11m1ts of
Manchuria in the fOllowing manner:
(a). Within six nonths from the signature of the agreement
to clear the southwestern portion of the Province of Mukden up
to the River Liao-che of Russian troops. and to hand the rail
ways over to China.
(b). Wtthin further K1x months to clear the remainder of the
Province of Mukden and the 2rcvince of Kirim of Imperial troop&.
(c). Within the sig months following to remove

t~e

remain

ing Imperial Russian troops Irom the Province of Hei-lungChiang.
AR'l'IC1:'; Iii •
...

,-.

in view of the necessity of prevent:ing jn the future any
recurrence of the disorders of last yeer, in which Chinese
troops stationed on the
Imperial Russtan and

Manchurian frontier took part, the

q~inese

Governments shall undertake to in

struct the Russian mili tary authori t1 es and the Tshmg-Tsungs.
mutually to come to an agreement resLl€cting the numbers and the
disposition of the Chinese forces until the Russian forces have
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been wtthdrawn. At the same time the Chinese Government binds
i teelf to organize no other forces over and above those decided
upon by the Russian arblBXtiJ: military authori tj es and the Tsiang
Tsungs as sufficient to suppress brigandage and pacify tile country.
After the complete evacuation of Manchuria by Russian
troops, the Chinese Government shall have the right to increase
or diminish the number of its troops in Manchuria, but of this
must duly notify the RusBis.n Government, as it is natural that
the m.g,intenance in the above-mentioned district of

an over large

number of troops must necessarily lead to a reinforceDent of
the

Rus~ian

military force in the neighboring districts,

and

thus would bring about an increase of expenditures on miljtary
requirements undesirable for both States.
For police service and maintenance of internal order
in the district outside those parts allotted to the Eastern
Chinese kn Railway Company, a police guard, under the local
Governors (" Tsiang-Tsungs"), consisting of cavalry and infant
ry, shall be organized exclusively of subjects of His

r~ajesty

the Emperor of China.
•

ARTICLE IV.
The Russia.n Government agrees to restore to the owners
the Railway Shanhaikwan-Newchwang-Sinminting, which, since the
end of September 1900, has been occupied and guarded by Russian
troops. In view of this, the Government of His Majesty the Em
peror of China binds itself:

1. In case protection of the abeve-mentioned line
should be necessary. that obligation shall fall exclusively on
the Chinese Government, which shall not invite other

~wers

to

participate in its protection. construction. or working. nor
allow other Powers to occupy the territory evacuated by the
Russian.
2. The completion and working of the above-mention

ed

line,sh&l~

be conducted in strict accordance with the Agree

ment between Russia and England of the

16th April, 1899, (No.

I04), and the Agreement with the private Corporation respect
ing the loan for the construction of the line. And furthermore.
the Corporation shall observe its obligations not to enter into
possession of or in any way to administer the Shanhaikwan-New
chwang-Sinminting line.
3. Should in the course of time. extensions of the
line in Southern manchuria, or construution of branch lines in
connection with it. or the erection of a bridge in Newchwang.
or the moving of the terminus there, be undertaken. these ques
tions ahall first form the subject of mutual discussion between
the Russian and Chinese Governments.
4.

In view of the fact that the expenses incurred by

the Russian Govermnent for the repair and working of the Shan
h2ikwen-Newchwang-Sinminting,line were not included in the sum
tOtal of damages, the Chinese Government shall be bound to pay
back the sum which. after examination with the Russian Govern
ment. shall be found to be due.'
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The stipulations of all former Treaties between
Russia and China which are not affected by the present Agree
ment shall remain in force.
The Agreement shall have legal force from the day of
i t~. e ignature by the Plenipotentiaries

0

f both states.

The exchange of ratifications shall take place in
St. Petersburg within three months from the date of the signa
ture

0

i' the Agreement.

For the confirmation of the above, the Plenipotent
iaries of the two Oontracting Powers have signed and sealed two
copies of the Agreement in the RUBsian, French, and Chinese
languages. Of the three texts, whjch, after comparison. have
been found to correspond with each other, that in the French
language shall be

consjdcred as authoritive for the

interpret8~

tion of the Agreement. n •

At the same time M. Lessar handed a note to the Chin
ese Plenipotentiaries, on behalf of the Russian Government, de
claring that rrthe surrender of the civil government of IHuchwang
into the hands of the Chinese would take place only after the
wi thdrawal froIj that port of the foreign forces and landing parties
and the restoration to the Chinese of the town of
under international administration

tl

•

Tie~-tsin,

then

and that if the Chinese gov

ernment, in spite of their positive aesurances, should. on any pre
text, violate the above
no longer consider

conQit~ons.

itsel~

the imperial government would

bound by the provisions if the

~xw••yx~
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Manchurain Agreement, nor by its declaration on this subject.
and would have to take all
.

~po~sibility

for all consequences

Jo

whi ch migh t .ens.ue " ••

Even the

co~paratively

mild terns of this agree

ment imposed upon China some conditions difficult to fulfill.
On the contrary, according to the tenor of the

agree~ent,

Chinese Empire would in eighteen months from the date of

the

sig~

nature regain all her lost sovereign rights in Hanchuria. The
convention seemed to confirm Russia's avowed love of peace and
·,her declared unwi llingness to jeopardize Chi na IS jierri torial
integrity. About the end of the first

s~x

months \ October B,

1902) from the conclusion of the agreement Russia withdrew her
troops from the southweatern portion of Mukden up to the Liao
River and handed back all the Railway outsidE of the Great Wall
to the administration of rekin. It is true that some troops
qlust have been sent back te " European Russia", but ethers
l"VIJre transferred to differeht stat ions in Siberia. incl udi ng
the strategically important Nikolsk near the eastern border of
11ancb~~ia

and still others to Mongolia where Russ 'ian forces

were reported to have suddenly increased, until in December
the~

3\

were said to have numbered about 27,000. In other words

the main part of the evacuation was merely the transferring of
Russian troops from Ohinese towns

an~

settlements to the devel

op1ng',Russ ian quarters \vi thin the limits of Xanchuria; and
the troops were not withdrat"m but were transformed into rail
way guards. llilichwang was not restored to China in spite of

the fact that the cond.itions formulated by M. Lessa.r ju. his NOT-E
VERBALE

lZ.

had been fulfilled. Its evacue.tion was dealarea indefinitly

delayed under the pretext of a few triv1al reasoni~ untj 1 the
Russians were

drive~

out of this important treaty port by the Ja

panese.
As April.8. 1903, the date set for the evacuation of
the

Kirin and that part of the Province of Spengking which

~rovince

lies east of the Liao-ho. was drawing near the disposi tien of the
Russian forces showed that not even a nominal withdrawal was in
tended. Not only did the troops remain, but. with the consent of
Admiral Alexieff. tha y. alro cut .timber on both sides of the Yalu
River, and even went ~o ,fong-am-po on the Korean side of the Yalu.
Furthermore. Russia in the meantime imposed upon China seven de
mands. which were rejected by the Chinese Government. thru her
Charge d' Affaires at

~iekin.

The authentic version of these d€rnands

~+

reads ae follows:

"1. No portion of territory restored to China by Russia,

especially at

~iu-chwang

and in the valley of Liao-ho. ehall be

leased or sold to any other Power under any circumstances; if such
sale or lease to ancther Power be concluded, Russia will take de
cisive steps in order to safequard her own interests, as she con
siders such sale or lease to be a menace to her.
"2. The system of government actually existing through
out

~ongalia

shall not be altered. as such

alteration~

will tend to

produce a regrettable state o.f affairs, such as the uprising of
the people .3.Ld the diBturbe.nces along the Russian frontier; the
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~tmost

precaution shall be taken in that

dir~ction.

"3. Chine shall engage herself not to open, of her
own accord, new ports of towms in Manohuria. without eiving
prev10us notice to the Russian Government, nor shall she per
mit foreign consuls to reside in those towns or pOEte.
"4. The e.uthority of foreigners wIle may be en
gaged by China for the administration of
shall not .be permitted to extend over any

an~

affairs whatever.

affa:~rs

in Northern

Provinces (including Chili), where Russia has the predominate
interests.
IT

In case Chins. desires to engage fo rei gners for

the administration of affai rs in Northern .Provinces, special
offices shall be established for the control of Russsians: For
instance, no authority over the mining affairs of Mongolia and
IJianchur1.a. shall be given to foreigners who may be engsg ed by
China for the administration of miniDg affairs: Such authority
shall be left ent1rcly in the hands of RUBsian Axperts.
"5. As long as there exjsts a telegraph line at
Niu-chwang and Port Jlrthur, the J:i.u-chwang-Peking line shall be
maintained, ue the telegraph line at Niu-chwang and Port Ar
thur and throughout Sheng-king .Province is under Russian con
trol, and its oOhnection wilh her line on the Chinese telegraph
poles at

Niu-chwa~,

:Port ArtLur, and Peking is of the 'ltmost

impcrtance.
"6. After restl1ring Niu-chwanif to the Chinese
local authorities the customs receipts there shdll, as at pre
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sent. be deposited with Russo-Chinese Bank.
"7. Arter the evacuation of Manchuria. the rights

which hall been

aC'~luired

in I'1ianchllria by Russj an subj ects and

foreign countries during Russian occupation shall rereamn unaf
fected; moreover, as Russia is duty-bounQ to insure the life of
the people residing in all the-regions traversed

by

the railway,

it is necessary, in order to provide against the sprean of epi
demic diseases in the Northern Provinces by the transportation
of passengers and goods by railway trains, to establish at Niu
chwang a quarantine office after the restoration of

~he

place to

China; The Russian civil administrators will consider the best
means to attuin that end. Russians only

sh~ll

be employed at the

post of eommissioner of Custom and Custom Physician and they
shal~

be placed under the control of the Inspector-General of the

:l~p~ri&l

tmritime Customs. These offici&l shall perform theft

duties consoientiously, shall protect interest of thellmperiel
maritime customs, and shull exhaust their efforts in preventing
the spread of those diseases into the RUEsian territory. A per
manent Sanitary Board, presided over by the Customs Tao-tai,
shull be established. The foreign Consuls. Commisei oner of Cus
tom, Custom Physjcian, and Aeent of the Chinese Eastern Railway
Company shall be Oouncilors of the Board. As regards ";;he estab
lh'lhnmnt of t he Board and the

managcmer~t

Customs Tao-Tai shall

with the Russian Consuls, and the

Customs

Tao-~ai

co~sult

of its affairs, the

shall devise the best means to obtain funds nec
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,f
essary for the purpose.

These demands such as comprising

"the non-aliena

tion of -,Manchuria to an:! other power," the s~s 0J!..9 in !'.:!ongol

.

ia", &nd drastic measures of closing the formar territory against
economic enterprize of all fo!eigners" except the Russiansbrought
vigorous protests from Japan,the United states, and Great Bri
tain, whose straight :forward foreign policy was expressed as
follows: " To open China impartially to the commerce of the whole
world, to maintain her independence and integrity, ana to

in~:

sist upo'n thf: fulfillment of treaty and other obligations by
3S

the Chinese

Government which uhe has contracted towe.rd us".
When the date set for the final eVEcuation o:f

Hei-lung-Kiang (October 8, 1903) arrjved the Russians were oc
cupying practically the whole of Manchuria except the west bank
o~iao-ho.

They were still in possession of the important POTt

o~uichwang,

and had actually reoccupied

to have greatly eXasperated

sought to resist

which was said

public feeling in the Mikado's

E:!!lpire against Russia. When the pf)ace

.

~ukden

~

loving Chinese _

the pressure by leaning on the rival Powers

she :found them to be little better than broken reeds. France
could not openly oVpose her ally; the Kaiser had reasons of his
own for consnl tinf:.. the Czar;

while Uncle Sam and John BUll,

tho avowedly opposing the scheme as dangerous to their COMmer
cial policy. were not prepared to go to war in defen8e of their
common policy. It seemed that by patience, tenAOity, diplomatic
d~xterity.

and spontaneous infiltration Russia might Ultimately
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attain her ends. But a surprise was in store for her.

There

was one power which recognized that her own vital interests
were at stake and was ready to undertake in defense of them

a~ive- and - death struggle; and for her the Manchurian ques
tion possessed a grave sighificance. for if the three

EaE~ern

Provinces fell into the hands of Russia her own territory
would be threatened, and her hope of exploiting the Asiatic
nj~~~iand

and of annexing Korea would be frustrated. Japan had

been smarting under the humiliation of her expulsion from
aotung

~eninsula

Li~

in 1895, a.nd watching with keen interest

every move in the game of international politics, meanwhile
confining her efforts to resisting the advance of Russian in
fluence into

manchuria and Korea. and supporting diplomatic

allY

the Powers who were upholding the prinoiple of the

"

d

open

for

n
oor·She
had been making military and naval preparation

~e~a~~~e

ever since 1895: and now that day was at hand

when the Western Powers would not prevent the realization of
Russia's grandiose scheme. Against the danger
was protected
in

190~).

b~l

a,

of·c~ition

she

her allianoe wi th Great Brit a1 n (concluded

and she felt assured that with Russia. alone she was

quite capable of dealing

single-handed. All at once she pas8

ed from the defensive to the offensive, and demanded that
Russia evacuate Manchuria immediately.

Her position was

brJtfly and graphically described in &.dispatohtelegraphed
to Mr. Kurino, then Japanese minister to St. Petersburg, int · t·Ions as f ollows:
structing him to open ne~~~la

3.
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"The recent oonduct

~f

Russia in making new de

mands at Pekin andin tightening her hold upon Manchuria has
led the Imperial Government to believe that she have abaLdoned
her intention

of retiring from the Province. At the same .time

her increased activity upon the Korean frontier

is suoh as to

raise doubts as to the limjts of her ambition. The uncondi
tional and permanent occlipation of .eJl.anchuria by Russia would
create a state of things prejudicial to the security and in
terests of Japan. The principle of equal

opportunj~y

(the open

door) would thereby be annulled, and the territorial integr1
ty of China inpaired. There is however a still more serious
consideration for the Japanese Government. If Russia were es
tsblished on the flank of Korea she would" constantly menace
the separate existence of that Empire, or at least exercise in
it a predominant influence; and as Japan consjdcrs Korea an
important

out~ost

in her line of defense, she regards its·in

dependence as absolutely essential to her own repose and safety.
Moreover the political as well as

cor~nerical

and industrial

interests and influence which Japan possesses in Korea are
paramount over those

Po~ers;

she cannot, having regard to her

own security, consent to surrender them to, or share them with
another Power".
In accordance with this view of the situati on.
Baron Komura, Japanese minister of Foreign Affairs, instructed
Mr. Kurino to inform Count Lamsdorff, Russian Mjnister

of

Foreign Affairs, that the Japanese Government desiring to re
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mave from the relation of the two empires every cause of fU
ture misunderdtanding, would be glad to enter with the Imper
ial Russian Government upon an examination of the

cond1tio~

of

affairs in the regions of the extreme east where their intereets
meet, with a view of defining their respective special

in~er-

ests in those regions; and that if this suggestion meets with
the approval of' the Russian Govern..ment. Japan would be prepar
ed t9 present

their views to 3t. Petersbyrg as to the na

ture and scope of the proposed understanding.
Altho Count Lamsdorff accepted Japan1s proposal
with apparent cOrdjalitj'thP, idea of general discu8sion was not
at all

~elcome.

The policy of the Russian Government was to

keep the whole situation until it had consolidated j.ts position
in Manchuria and on the

Aorea~frontier

to such extent that it

could dictate its own terms in any future arrangement. It, how
ever, consented to an exchange of views, but in order to ensure
that the tightening of its hold on the territories in
should proceed

~a2:i pa&~

'~luestion,

with the diplomatic action; it made

an extraordinary departure from ordinary procedure, entrusting
the conduct of' the affair not to Count Lamsdorff and the For
eign Office but to Admiral Alexeyev the newly appointed vicer
oy of the .Far East, in whom was vested the oontrol of all civil,
~ilitary,

naval and diplomatic affairs relating to that

Far~

of the world. The negotiations went on from August 12, 1903
to February 6, 1904, during whicD period neither party retreat
ed a step from

the~LpoBitions

originally taken up.

~~at

Japan

1

~I
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insisted on obtaining was the privileges of the "open door"
(altho her motives are now
right of settlement in

fundamenta~ly

different) and the

Manchunia which Russia obstinately re

fused. She was soon convinced that the fowward policy of the
Colossus was not to be stopped by paper barricades. Japan sud
denly

broke

off diplomatic negotiations with Russia. On Feb

ruary 8, 1904, the Japanese atta.cked the Russian squadron, and
thus began one of the greatest wars in the history of the world.
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Cited in Asakawa HUGso-Japanese Conflict,
24~

~,

..3'
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Chap.15, pp.242

•

China,

Ho.90, (1904).

See Asakawa,

Landowne to Herbert (April 28) •

Russo-Japanese Conflict,

Chap.18,

pp.296-99.

Count Lansdorff had ver.l often said to I:r. Zurino, "an under
standing between the two countries was not only desirable.
but was the best poli cy'·'. "Should Russ ia and Japa.n enter
into a full understanding" said he, "no one would in future
attempt to sow the seeds of discord between the two countries".
This is quoted in Asakawa, Russo-Japanese Conflict, Cbap.
18. pp.299.
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Chapter Z .
•

t1hat the War conferred upon Japan in China.

The victory of Japan over Russia has radically
changed the conditions in Manchuria. For the purpose of study
ing the altered situation it

is necessary to exar:llne the

Russo-Japanes€ Treaty of Peace signed in Portsmouth, N.H.,
September 5, 1905, und various other documents having some di
rect bearing on that treaty. The treaty provided for the sim
ultaneollS evacuation of Manchuria by both Japan and Russ1a;for
the transfer to Japan

py Russia with the consent of China,of

the lease of Port Arthur, and of the port of Ta-lien, and also
the railroad between Chang-Chun and Port Arthur, together with
the coal mines in said region belonging to or worked for the
benefit of the railway. It was also provided that the two con
tracting purties engage to exploit their respective railways
in

~!ianchuria

exclusively for cOElmercial and industrial purposes

a.nd in nowise for strategic pi.Arpoees. with an understanding
that this restriction does not apply to the railway in the ter

,

ritory affected by the lease of Liao-tung.
~€

shall presently see the properties obtained

by Japan a.s a resu.lt of the war are as follo\Vs:
(I) She has secured the lease oi" ·Port

.Arthu~.

rralien, and

the adjacent territory, and all rights. privileges and con
cessions connected

with or forming part of such lease. The

area of the leased territory covers the vhole

8er~ien

of that

.&of ~ portion of Liaotung peninsula lying to the @Ruth

of an imaginary

line drawn from the north of A-tang-'Bay on

the West aoast of Liatung (passing thru the ridge of A-tang
Nlountain, the mountatn being included

in the IBased ground)

to the east coast of Liaotung near the north side of Pi-tzu
wo Bay. To the north of the boundary thus fixed there is a
neutral zone~

inwnic.h China retains her jurisdjction, but

relinguishes the right of quartering troops. The term of the
lease is fixed as twenty-five years, of which seven years had
ela.psed. under Eusstan administration. so that at the end of
eighteen years from the time of its transfer (December fr.
1905) Japan should wi thdraw

with the

stip~lations

fl'01!l

t 11e peninsula in accordan ce

of thE Russo-Chinese Treati'of Lease

which she pledged to adhere to.
(2) iiext is the acquisition by Japan of the

Railw~y

between Chang-chun on thf" north and.. Talien on the south, cov
ering some 436 miles, and the three branch lines as follows:
(a)

l~an-Kuauling

to Port Arthur (28 miles). (b) Ta-shih-Chis. 0

to Yinkow (14 miles), and (c) the branch to

the~"u.shun

coal

fj eld (34 J!li les). Thus v:e see the hai lways ceo.. eo.. to Japan b;y
Russia amounted to

51~

miles, the cost of which was about 76,

E22,OOO rubles. 11hese rai1'.'iays together with their appurtenances

must be handed over to China without compensation at the expira_
tion of eighty years from tnt day of the opening of
(in 1903}, according to the

agreeme;~t

tra~fic

concluded between RUlisia

-and China in September 1896. However the Chinese government
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has the right to take back these lines at the expiration of
thirty-six years from the opening of the traffic on ref'unding
the concessionaire

all the outlays made OL them.

(3) In addition to the

railWB~

trans fe rred by

Russia Japan has secured from China "the right to maintain
and work the military railway line cons'tructed between Antung
and ~ukdeJ anu to improve the said line so as to make it fit
for the conveyance of commercial and 1ndustrial
nations.

Ii

goods of all

The duration for which such right is conceded is

fifteen years

from date of completion.

(4). In

conse~uence

of the Chino-Japanese Agreement

of 1905 a joint stock company was orp-anized for the exploi ta
f

tion of the forests in the regions on the right bank of Yalu,
composed of Chinese and Japanese capitalists. The shares are
equally

divided between

tne~.

Jurthermore Japan solicited the Chinese Government
to open ther following cities and towns in l',1anchuria as places
~

of international ret>iclence and trade:
In the Prov4noc of

Sheng~ing:-

Fenghwangcheng, Liaoyang, Hsinmintum, Tiehling,
Tung-~iang-tzu

ad

Fakumen.

In the Province of Kirin:
Changchun, Kirin, Harbin, languta, Hungchun and
Sanhsing.
In the Province of Heilungkiang:Teitsihar, Hailar, Aigun (Aihun) and Manchulir.
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liewchwang and Dalny had already been ports of international
trade and

co~nerce

for several years prior to the

Antung, Tatun-Xow, and liukden were

ope~ed

~ar,

while

in October 1903,

as a consequence of the joint request of Japan and the United
States.
A moment's glance at the map of Horth China re
veals the iuportance of these selectee.. places. While

solict~

ing China to open these ports Japan no doubt had taken into
considerati.on, not only t.ile commercial viewpoint, but also
the strategical. From the

strategical point of View the Ja

panese considered that the above-mentioned towns or cities,
expecially.Aiglln, Hungchlln, Manchuli, Railar, ana. Hinguta
(five frontier or semi-frontier posts). when transformed into
markets of international commerce, would present themselves
as serious handicapps in t he way of

Ru~,sia I

ion upon the "Three Eastern Provinces ".

s future aggress

Foot-notes.
Chapter II.
I

~

For French text. see Hertslet'f China Treaties.
pp.608-613.

yol.1.

The northern boundary of the neutral zone commences on the
West coast of Liao-tung, at the mouth of Raichon River, pass
es nc.rti: 'Jf Yu-yu-Chang to the Ta-yb.ng River. and follows
the left bank of that river to its mouth. which is included
in the neutral territory •. See Hertslet's China Treaties,
Vol.l, pp.50~.

~ The Autung-!.~u.k:den Railway amounts to 18~ miles. The right
of reconttruction is conceded to Japan by agreement in the
Chtn6-Japane~e Treaty signed at Pekin, Dec. 22, 1905.

*

All these places have now been opened to trade.
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PART II.

..

CHINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS SINCE THE WAR •

Chapter -3. '
The Balkans of the Far East.

It is only within the last two decades that
Manchuria has become the focus of great political ambitions
and desires. The advent of Russia with its bold

po~icy

of

railway and mining developments stimulated international int
erest as well as international jealousy.
interest, or jealOUSY

This international

has raised the question as to how to

dispose• of this salubrious and fertile region, with an area
to that of France and Germany combined; and has given rise
to many attempts to

re~d

a satisfaotory solution of the many

questions affecting the interests of the Powers.
Uanci-luria, and its inhabi tants have ple.yed a very
conspicuous part in the history of China. It was in 1644 that
t~l€

ManchUI' accomplished the downfall of the "Ming dynasty",

and assumed, from that time on the supreme power for about
two and half centuries in spite of frequent revolutions within
and persistent terri torial and commercial aggressions from wi t}~~
out. rtWhile the Manchus were ehgaged in a struggle that was
to give to them the throne of China, the tr&ditional policy
of Russia which ever since has been to free herself from the
grip of ice and snow and to extend southwards toward the sun,
found its

I

ince~tion.

Marauders crossed the frontier, settling
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~;

n Northern manchuria,

and, as the result of a prolong

ed confliot with the Chinese, the treaty of Nerohinsk was
concluded

1n l8S9. This treaty, and the later treaty of

Aigun defined the boundaries of the two empires, and in
1860 a supplementary treat.,..- was concluded at Pek::i.n which
settled the frontier questi ons between the two countri es.
For thirty-five years (1860-1895) YJanchuris. enjoyed tranquil
ity in that it was not concerned wjth external aggression,
but whe:n Japan insisted upon the cession of the Liaotung
peninsula as a result of her victory over Chj.na. in 1895,
she und.oubtedly had in mind the extenflion of her

influeI~ce

-:in southern 1mnchuria on a large scale, and aided by the
~&r€ful investigations of hG~gents in all parts pf the

ccuntry she was better informed than amy other foreign coun
try concerning the internal conditions and the value of the
potential resources waiting for exploitation.
Manchuria is today the scence of one of the keen
est commercial struggles ttiat hes ever witnessed in the world.
In other words it is tods.y to the Far East what the Balkans
have for so long been to Eurqpe; it is the focus of great
political designs and internati.onal interest; and here the
issues are moving toward a culmination which may cause aR
other life and death struggle.
Since the termination of the war three political
powers have striven for supremacy in

l~nchuria.

each animat

39.

""J• •

ed by widely differing motives, yet compelled

tempor~r-

ily unuer circumstances to compromise their antagonisms.
These are China, Russia, and Japan. China, thp. recognized
sovereign of the region, attempts, with all her efforts, to
acccmplish a resumption of her governmental functions; while
Japan and Russi-i s.re, to a certain degree, the actua.l eover

,

ei.gns, basing their

authorit~r

upon military occllpat1on."Only

ser.d-chaotic condittons" said Millard, "could prevail under
such ctrcumstances; but efforts of the three nations each to
have its

own way and secure to itself the greater advantage

have developed much of signifiQ&noe; and other
ne-tions, while

abstain~ng

int~rested

from action likely to annoy or em

berrass the recent belligerents, have been keenly alive to
t..

whs. t is going on". Each power wants to obtain control of
territory more on account of its

t.

he

industrial and commercial

possibilities than its military importance.
The area. of Manchuria, tho never correctly as
certained. is about three times as laree as the united Kingdom
J

of Great Britain and Ireland. Until within the past fifty

yea~s

it was a little known land; even the Chinese themselves paid
scant heed to its COl'llr.lercial possibjI1t:es. In "pre-treat;y
days"there were no travellers ever visi t . . ng the port of :r.auch
wang, and, besides. for many years after it had. been declared
open

trade progressed but slowly. It was thought that

i~nchur-

ia would never offer a great market for £oreign goods. It was
toward the end of the third decade that the awakening came.
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All at once it began to appear that a bright commercial
fn ture lay before Nu1 chwang. The ye,'J,':: 1890 showed a nota
ble increase in
vai~ation

trade~

which was perhaps due to a careful

of commodities which was introduced in that

year~

and to an actual increase in the body of merchandise. The
following years

undoubtedly gave Etill larger results, a!ld

the decades

to

18~2

cantile developments

1~12

were remarkable for & series of mer

perh&~s

unparalleled in the history of

.J)

r(

the China-tn.. ue. The very aspect of the place unde rwent a
rapid change, the mud village of'the sixties grew into a rich
and populous town, wi th fine shops, magnificient ::mildings,
and large lactories. It will be realized that the sleepy bean
mart of the old days has passed away forever. For many years
it has been the

polic~T

of the Chinese government to keep

l~orth

Manchuria undeveloped. but in the eighties there were signs
of a change of view. These were seen in the fortifications of
the northern frontier, and in the encouragement which was
given to iT'L"!ligrants to take up unoccupied land in the Three
Provinces. People continued to pour in. more land was culti
vuted,

End more grain produced. The soil gave forth abund

antly; there was a large supply of agricul t~Lral products to
be disposed of. Transport, tho difficult and

expensive~

was

not hamLJered. and at tile moment when there was superabund
ance of supply there arose in Japan a great demand for the
staple productions. The discovery of the Japanese market for
beans and beancakes was the most potent economical factor in

the development of trade in southern Manchuria.
Of all

~he

vast territories that China contains

Manchuria is looked upon as the one possessing the best
conditions for immediate exploitation on a large scale. The
Russian~

were the first to begin exploitatien in earnest,

and as a result of the Russo-Japanese war the attention of
the whole world has been dravm to one of the most interesting
friends of international enterprise. Altho the Chinese have
been at last seriously awakened to a realization of the pot
ential value of t he resources of :Tanchuria and have done
much within recent years to encourage emigration to that re
gion there is little

pro~pect

that in the immediate

future

the natives will be able to derive any considerable share of
the fruits of the enterprise that is in progress in their
midst. Viewed from every standpoint of natural advantage.
Manchuria off€:ts an attractive field for the invE;stment of
capi tal. Al tho thE:' cl j metE; is essentially dry arl(.l endurnble,
nevertheless there are magnificent waterways drajni.ng enor
mous areas of fertile plains. On the northern boundary flows
the great Amur. which is nCi-vigable for steamers of Slight
draught along nearly the whole of its length. Through the
heart of

~llincmlriu

flows the Sungari, which is navigable for

a distance of over six hundred miles. while its principal
tributary, the Nonni, affords an excellent waterway for small
craft for a distance of four hundred miles above the point of
~

confluence'. In the south the L:iao River, 'Iwhich flow'jng into
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the Gulf of 1iaotung is navigable for junk traffic to the
extent of two hundred miles of its course, while on the north
western border of Korea is the famous Yalu, of sufficient
depth to admit of the passage of steamers drawing eight feet
as far- as the important town of Antung.
As far as the water-way cpmmunication is concern
ed

~~nchuria

is ice-bound for four months during the year.

which is therefore a serious d.rawback to the commerctal de
velopment of the country. Before the vast resources of
churj a can be reached to

a~7

t~n

measurable extent the probler1

of communication must be solved. Japan; reali.dng that r;;an
churia needs an adequate raj lway system more than anyth ing
else, lays claim to the exclusive right to sup)ly this need
in the south, but she is not financially able to assume the
undertaking of extensions on a large scale. Unless an ade
quate system of land communication can be supplied the pro
gress of tlanclmria. will suffer to no small extent. It 1 e
calculated by Prof. 2arker that sllould ;ilanchuria ever be de
veloped to its fullest pOEsibilities, its products. both in
quality and

~uantity.

would be as fanous in the world's

~,r

kets as the wheat of Canada and the cotton, corn,and beef of
the United States.
place it is

~efore

necessar~?

this stage of development can take

according to Dr. Parker, that there

should be good roads to connect wi th the railways am watcr

wllYs~ "With good roads, and better transport facilities", says
~:~r.

Cloud (see foot-note 8). "new markets would be reached.
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the cost of product jon and marketing would be redu.ced"7mor8
than one-half, production be stimulated, and the land of
Mllnchu would enter upon an era of prosperity and progress
scarc~ly

second to that enjoyed by the inhabitants of the

trans-Mississippi plains during the past thirty

years~

Furthermore it is estimated that the Sqnrari and the Nonni
drain an area of thirty million acres unsurpaEsed for the
richness of its soil

b~

any other grain

bea~ing

tract in the

world. Opinion in unanimous that r.ianchuria is destined to be
come the granary of the Far East. But it must not be j.nagined
that

its prosverity is altogether bound up with

a~rjculture.

It will in the future hold a prominent place among the great- .
est timber-producing regions of the world. The whole region
between the lalu and Hun Rivers, known as the Laoling range,
is one vast tract of larl covered. with dense forests) and the
belt of timber extends in unbroken succession thru the pro
vince of Kirin and the basin of Sungari far north over the
Changpai mountains. In the province of Hei-lung-Chiang there
are millions of thickly wooded acres; and the lumber industry

,
of the railway to Harbin. It is apparently be

in whicn both Chinese and Russians enge.f:e, flourishes within
easy distance

cause of the timber producing lands in the basin of Yalu that
the attention of the world as well as that of Japan has been
focused upon uanchuria. In fact the Russian exploitation of
these forests was one of the principa.l canses that led Japan
to viage war with Russia.
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The prinoipal kinds of timber produoed in
the Yalu
cassie;

~asin

are pine, fir, oak, walnut, elm, laroh, and

and~the

average of all these varieties is estimated

in value at about one million or more sterling a year. The
Japanese have established a number of saw-mills and a few
paper mills. At present the lumber industry has almost passed
its

sta~e

of infancy, but it is the opinion of many competent

jUdges that the products of the Yalu forests will take the prom
inent place they deserve in the markets of the world.'
The mineral resources in Manchuria are super
abundant. Tho not as yet been seriously exploited the results
already obtained from the working of gold, iron. coal. silver,
copper, lead, and soda justify the belief that there is

~ntOld

potential wealth covered by the soil of this vast territory.
Gold is found practically everywhere throughout the length and
breadth of the three provinces •. but the richest deposits are
found on the rigilt bcnk of the Amur Kiver, the line of demarca
tion between Siberia and Manchuria. In Fengtien fold is known
to exist at two places in the Liangtung Peninsula, in the east
near the city of Tung-hua-hsien, a few miles to the north of
~~o-erh-shan,

between the Yalu River and the Chang-pai-shhu

mountains. In Kirin it is found forty miles to the north east
of Hunchun, near the Russian frontier. in the bed of a tribu
tary of the Turnen, still further north in the v&lley of the Sui
fen 1\i ver. v7hich i'lows into the .AInur Ba¥- on which Vladi 'lOS tok
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stands

I

sixty f'i ve miles west by north of Hunchun in an

other tribi tary of the Tumen, on the banks
Sungari and tributaries,
Sansing - a

of the Ul')per

and seventy mileS to the east of

town at the junction of the Sungari and the

Hurka or 2utan River - near the headwaters of a river which

•

flows into the Sungari to the north of that town. No doubt
gold is found in other parts of

r~nchuria,

but the above are

the best known centers. Iron, coal, and soda are extensively

. -..

worked. It is only within the Japanese sphere of influence,
i.e. southern Manchuria, that mining developments are at pre
sent in progress. When the Eussians were in occupation of this
territory they paved the way for tl:ese developements, but they
as yet, have not sufficiently recovered from the disastrous
effects of the war to enable them to begin a serious exploita
ti on in the far north. Japan was ,:;ui ck to take full ad vantafe
of the valuable mining riehts conceded to her in the provis
sion of the Treaty of Portsmouth. The Fushan and
fields are today

regard~d

Y~ntai

coal

as the most profitable of all the

various undertakings co:,ducted b;" the 30uth !Lanchurian I\t::d 1
way; it is expected that

t~e

total output from these two

mines will eventually reach 5000 tons daily. The Fushan mine
is undoubtedly one of the richest coalfields in Eastern ASia.
Seams of 50 and even 100 feet of coal of excellent quality
have heen found, and it

is estimated that the total deposits

available for exploitation amount to considerably over 400,
DOO,OOO tons.
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It is clear

th~t

awaiting development in Man

churia are resources of enormous value. These resources are
not necessarily restricted in character. The1r
be judged from the following list, showi
b~siness

enterprises, for wiich there

~re

variet~r

may

the d1ffercnt
promising oppor

tunities:
1. bean-oil manufacturing.
2.

Utili~ation

of bean refuse.

3. Silkworm raising.
4. Sake blewing.
5. Salt re finine.
6 .. Flax manufacturi ng.
7. Flour

~illing.

8. Tanning.
9. Paper making.
10. Cannjpg industry.
11. Silk spinning.
12. Weaving.
13. ForestrY,.
14. Grain growing.
15. Stock raisjng.
16. :.1arine industries.
17. Transit and carrying business.
It mnly renains to be added that meat, food.
fuel, and labor can be obtailied in abundance. That Japan
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has so far not failed to take advantage of the special pos
ition which her political influence has enabled. her to ac
~uire,

is seen in the fact that ever since the terminetion

of the war with Russia she has suoceeded in establishing
twenty-seven bean-oil factories. sixteen brtck factories.
one cement factory.
and three salt

~en

iron works. eight lime factories.

farms~ It is evident 'hat Japan wjll have a large

share in the development of.the rich mdneral fields in South
.rn Manchuria, and her posi tion in that regi on will remain
strong until the t~me ccnes when a rejuvented China may expel
her from the mainland.

Foot-notes.
Part II.
Chapter 3 •

•

Lancelot JJawt on I s "The Emt')ires 0 f the Far East:r.
pp.ll09-1110.
.

Vol.II,

z. This is taken from Millard's "The Far Eastern ':uestion:'.
pp.165.
~ The Japanese estimate the area at 379,095. sq. m11es; other

authorities estimate it 400,000 sq. miles.
Vol.II, pp.1116.

Lancelot Lawton,

4 Mr.Butnam Weale #ho travelled extensively in this region,
says in his book, tUrhe coming struggle in Eastern ..4..8 i aI,' that

this amber-colored Sungari River which connects the two ?ac~f~c
coasts routes together is so full of water i.n spring and
sarr~er that it would be p08sible to sail a shallow-draught
vessel straight from the upper Yantsze and the M~ur by way of
Vle.di vostok reaching to Sungari and Harbetn in a very f'ew days
steaming. In other words he adds, it 12 possible to travel
three thousand miles by water from the heart of central b*JL
'KJ!JrrXB: China to ti1e heurt of Central I'ianchurie..
See Putnam Wealetl.s "'The Coming struggie in Eastern ASfa".
pp.t;:3l.
'5'

Professor Parker 0 f !;iinn. Uni v. who was employed by t he Chinese
Gov. after the Russo-Japanese war to establish an agricultural
college and experjmental station at ~Qkden made a specie.l
study of the local conditions. His opinion is supperted by Mr.
F.D.Claud. who gas been Vice-Consul-General at BukCien. Lawton,
Vol.II.
pp.112)-1122.

b

Read Lawton IS,

701. II,

PP .1138-1139.

, This is the opinion of Lancelot Lawton and Sir Alexander Hsie,
who has traveled in all parts of llanchuria.
~ Th'18 1S
. given in Lancelot Lawton's Empires of the Far East,

Vol.II,

pp.1147.
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ChE.pter

~

4.

Japan's Policy in Manchuria.

It is a matter of common knowledge that the abund
unce of potential wealth of Mancauria. the possibility of ita
becoming one of the granaries of the world, and the immensi ty
of

its fertile plains were among the principal causes that

led Japan into the war with

Ru~sia.

She has, for a long time,

looked forward to an opportunity for absorbing

~anchurie,

but

lias always posed as the Champion of the Open Door. It was in
com:;equence of this atti tn<ie that she gained the sympathy and
support of Great Britain and the United
the war, anxious to obtain sympathy in
avowed her detestation of the selfish

States. Previous to
~urope

~Olicy

and

;~erica,

she

of Russia. She

pretended to be seriously shocked at the mere tI1.ought that the
integrity of China was endangered and the principle of the
Open Door threatened. In effect she communicated with the fin
ancial markets of' IJondon ano.. .iJew York

say,ir~g:

" If you will

lend us the rHoney we will rea<ii ly sacrifice thousands of lives
in waging a cruslide against the wicked MUScOVites, s.n<i should
we gain the victory we will restore :llanchuria to our old friend
and neighbor. China, and thus rend.er secure for all time tIle

,

sacred doctrine of the !I0pen Door": But, to the amazement of
all, she changed her attitude iT"..illlediately after the

battle

was won. Japan argued that the "Family of Uations tl surely
could not expect her to adopt a policy in the South more
honest - or to

s~eak wit~

strict accuracy, less dishonest 

than that pu,rsued by Russia in the Horth. She aaid "we
wish it to be clearly understood that as soon as Russia
sets us an example in the fulfillment of treaty obligations,
1

we will follow". Lastly. in her efforts to

~ustify

her at

titude and her aotions, she pleaded that as she had expend
ed much blood and treasure she was entitled to make the
most of her

o~portunities

in Manchuria. The measure of the

reward to which she is entitled is well defined in the Treaty
of Portsmouth, and

as far as

1~nchuria

is concerned, be

sides the possession of the leased territory of the Liaotung
:Peninsula and the railroad between chanf:-ohun and :?ort
),

Arthur, she cannot lay claim to any special rightn. It may
be urged that Jap&n has not acquired these poss'essions, with
out fOirst concnlti.ng China, but it' would be idle to olaim
that all the actions of the Japanese in

~nchuria

been

fjnd sanction at

the SUbject of foreign oomplaint

which have

Pekin. On the other hand there is every reason to believe
that Japan was taking advantage of the weakness of China and
pursuing an eXlusive policy.
The alleged rights of Japan in Manchuria vary
greatly in character, but a majoritj consist of real estate
and. other vested int erests. For t he purpose of claus i fi cation
they may be discussed under two heads, viz; rights or inter
ests which the Japanese claim to have inhori ted. from the
Russians. a.nd rights and interests which they claim to have
a,gquired since their occupation of the country. When rights
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which have been inherited from the Russians are mentioned
one natura.lly thinks of the South Iaanchurian Railway (Chin
ese Eastern Railway). which is provided for in the treaty.
But,the railway and the lease of Dalny and Port Arthur are
by no

m~~n8

the limit of Japan's olaims.
besides tbe railway. Japan claims that all

concessions formerly neld by Russia revert to her, a.nd has
established herself iL possession of them. They chiefly con
sist of mining and timber concessi ons. l;ven be fore peace was
declared

~ining

experts in the employ of the Japanese Gov

ernment were Bet to work in southern

~anchuria

and along

upper Yalu, to make an examination of the mineral resources
of the country; while after tne terrninf.ition of hostili ties,
undoubtedly. this prospecting was continued on a wide scale.
Hot only are all mi nes forme:t:ly opened or prospected by the
Russians in soutbcrn Manchuria now in the hands of Japanese,
but so also are many to which

the Russians never make a

claim. During Russian ocmlpation beside land and buildjngs
purchased from Chinese residen ts of the countr.t, much real
property was occupied under circumstances which savored
strongly of appropriation, Such actions of the Russians were
strongly criticised b;.Y' Tokio, and the moral neeci foy someone
to intervene in behalf of China '.vas pointed out by the Ja
panese press. The Chinese government also

prot~sted

at these

illicit actio;ns, and succeeded in a number of instances in
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compeJ.ling resti tuti on, or securing payment for t he own
ers. When the Japanese succeeded in expelling the RUBsians

t

much of such property fell into the hands of themselves.
In other words the shoe is now on another foot, and the
Japanese government shows a disposition to claim as a legi

tin~ate

inheri tance what it formerly objected to Russia s
I

taking. Japan's argunent seer;:1S to be that ·'the robber I s
spoi 16 be longs to the!I'an who drives him off". ChiIlB. has
taken issue with her rcpeate&ly, pointing out that many
of Russia's alleged privileges bre property rights never
were recognized

a~

valid by China, but on the contrary.

were strenuously disputed.
all coal

~nd

other

~1nes

I~

this category China pl&ces

formerly operated and claimed by

RUssia, amd ®lch of the reul estute jncluded in and adjac

+,

ant to former Russian settlement s along the railway. llore
over in regard to some former Russian concessions, Japan
is inclined to stretch theT"! farther than the RUBsians them
selves ever attempted to do.
Chinese property fared no better under the Ja
panese occupation than under the Russian. The unfortunate
residents of HancflUria i'ound themselves confronted by a
similiar und far greater acquiEition of public and private
property

b~

the Japanese. This is best sean in the

eee settlement of Antung ann Newchwang.
near the

m~uth

" to be occupied.

AntUI~.

Japan

situated

of Yalu, was &lnost the first in !lanchuria
b~l

S

the Jt1.panese army. Soon after the Japanese

5~

•

occupied this town, early in 1904, steps were taken to
create a Japunese settlement. When the war ended a. thriving
settlement was already established, wi th shops and other
e.cti vj tt es that usually are to be found in Japan. I twas
found that practically all the river front available for
wharfage and shipping purposes had been secured by Japan
ese.

~early

the whole of this property had been in

d~spute.

Japan contended that the land was regularly Durcm sed from
the yroper owners, and l)&id for. Tbis seems to be ti'ue
a prima

fac~

j

n

sense; but many owners now assert that they were

forced tc part with their property, and that they did
receive the money

a~propriated

~ot

by the JaVanese eovernment.

A simi liar case occurred at Jewchwang, a treaty
post which v".as the only one fuLly opened in
war bor"an, and wbich ",vas occupjed at

t~meE

~.~:.r.cburj

a \',hen

bJ both helliger

ents. IIben the R"uus:"Hn eovernment built a branch of the
Chinese Eastern Railway from
Nuichwang

termin~s

~aBhihchio

to llcwcbwang, the

was plficed on the river

b~nk

nearly three

ni les above tbe city, where a small villuB'e grew up al'oum
the station. {/hen the J[i.lnmeSe cccupied Uewchwang, they es
ta11lished. a Ivrge

E~n{lJ

br.. sc at tile rail'le.y station. As tl1€

land previously occlipieQ by the

Rus8i~ns

was not suffic

ient for Japanese purposes, large additions were requisition
ed by t he army. .!, P.1Bcadami zed road was bui 1 t from t hp. ci ty to
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and beyond the railway station. At the time when

construct~

ion of this road was commenced. it was spoken of as a

mili

tary necessity and so regarded by the "Family of nations";
but, 'ifter peace was decls,red, work on the road was continued
and extended. and the whole of the large tract lying between
the city and the station, by th(j river, was laid out in cross
streets for a Japanese settlement, Japan contends that this
property was secured by ordinary purchase, but, as at Antung,
many former owners now claim that they were induced to sell by
coercion.
Conditions as illustrated by property disputes
in Antung and Newchwang are universal, in some degree at least,
throughout all parts
~ion has been and is

of Manchuria where Japanese

administra

appl.ied. l'Iot only has the Japanese Govern

ment. thru its regular o:U"jc j als, aC:luired, under eilui vocal \
circumstances a large amount of what formerly was Chinese and
private property; but hundreds of instances are known where
Japanese subjects have been supported by their government in
acquiring the property against the protest of the ovmers.
Of the inl1umers,ble cases where the inhabi tar.ts
of lJanchuria claim to have been Jorcibly and wrongly deprived
of their property, one of considerable inportance is that of
the timber industry along the Yalu river. 'rho13e who followed
the diplomnttc recrimj nati ons which irr.uned iately preceded the
late waT may recall that alleged ir:lproper Ru.ss ian afp:res 61 ons
in the YBlu timber region was

~ad~

a ground of conplaint by

Japan. It was ccntended by Japan thnt Rlulsian clHiras to t5mbe"r
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..

concesp:\.ons on both hanks of the Yalu

were, in effect, fralld

ulent, and. constituted a direct, and further ae:gress1on upon both
Chinese and Korean terrjto~y which Japan could not tOlerate~;
Japan has not here, as in other pl&ces, absolutely demanded
timber concession in

t~nchuria

t~E

formerly olaimed by Russia; but

she cauEed to be inserted into the supplementary agreement to
the convention with China (December 22, 1905) relating to

t~n-

churia a clause providing for the organization of a company to
exploit forests on the Tjght bank of the Yalu, the Korean stde
now being absolutely controlled by
ment

~as

signed the Japanese

ties in question

r-.

Japan~

Long before this agree

had taken possession of the proper

and have since been using them as their own,

regardless of the wishes of nati ve i.nhabi tants; and the clfluse
referred to seems tc gjve e color of legality tc Japan's past
and present actions.
When the Japanese army occupied the Yulu region,
the militury autr_ori.t:es a.t once took possess:ton oi' this industr;y',
and have since retained complete supervision of it. Tentative
attempts have been made to satisfy the Chinese interested in the
lumber business in the Yalu region. by offering to include them
in a corporation to be

organiz~d

under the terms of the treaty;

but the Chinese certainly havE not wanted to

oe included in the

prop:sed compa.ny, for tiley feared that it wou.ld be conciuatE d by
the Japanese chiefly for thei r own intErest. rrhe cor.!lnercial repu
tation of the

J~panese

pecple, if not &11,
enterpri~es

in the ?ar East iE today such that

~esitate

to become

as~ociated

eXCelJt under candi tiona which insure

~ost

with them in

e(~ui ty

H-nd
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honest administration.
The beginning of Japa.nls direct comnercial ac
tivity in

!,~anchuria

did not wait upon conclusion of the vvar.

It was pointed out, before hostilities ter!-ainuted, thut thous
ands of immigrants and commercial agents were

trar~ing

upon the

heels of Japanee,e armies. The Japanese residents jn r.".:s.nchuria
mostly consist of adventurers of small means, mixed

w~th

not a

fevl vagrants and men engageCi in shamful busineso. The maj ori ty
of these people are on the look-out to enrich themselves at the
expense of other J'apenese residents, while Borne of them are en
gaged in defrauding the native inhabitants. It has often been
stated, however, that the Japanese are unable to establish them
Delves firmly owing to small economic panics occuring from time
to time. As a matter of fact the economic depression has led to
an exodus from Manchuria. As a means of remedy a certain respon
sj ble uuthori ty - the Government of Tokio drafted a memorj,al in
19(J), on the colonization of Iiianchuria which was submitted to the
goveIL"J·3nt. The [;ist of the memorial is as fellows:
"The colonization of' an unopened uountry must be
carried out on u fixed policy_ All the &dvanced countries of
Europe have a fixed policy of' coloni za ti on, whi le Japan has no
fixed policy. The immigrants have so far been
ers

batches of labor

unworthy of the appellation of real settlers. Now that a

vast truct of land in Manchuria and Korea is 0Ilen for the ex
pansion of the Japanese, it is eVidently an urgent necessity to
establish firmly & fixed colonization policy. Setting Korea aside,

56 •

..

the government has so Tar dohe nothing in regard to the< 001
onization of Mancmlria, but allowed it to take its
course. The

iL~igrants

tural '

have not received any special facili

ties from the rail-.fay andc; steamship companies in oonneQtion
with their passage, while a.bnormal rent has beun charged bY the
South Manchuria Railway Company, iT they
these

circumst~.nces

d(~jred

to settle. In

it is no wonder that the iIIlI"ligrants find it

difficult to settle in the country. The colonization policy

0

European countries consists in granting special facilities to
intending immigrants, thet is, granting a fixed subsidy, allowing
discount on rai.lway and steamship freights, or eranting them a
piece of land to settle upon. The methods must be adopted to
encourage colonists to go to

:~nnchuria.rhe

Russian coloniza

tion policy in the 1!'ar E6.Bt mirht be allowed with edvantage.
The Russian Government grants intending colonists a
400

SlliU

of

roubles, together with Tree passage and the grant of a

free lease of

cert~in

tracts of land. The different circum

stances existing render a modification necessary, but the Rus
sian method may be adopted as a basi8. For the prosecution of
the colonization policy as

abo~e

delineated an outlay of about

Y 20,000,000 spread over several fiscal years is

practicable under the present

str~ined

~erhaps

im

condit jon of finance,

but the govcrrunent would not be paying too dear

~

vrice for

utilizing the results of the war which cost Japan a sum OT a
bout Y 2,000,000,000. Such an appropriation must be considered
~

as an unavoidable expenditure".
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As

8

result of this memorial the legislative bodies of

Japan have adopted a somewhat fixed policy. Special inducements
with direct encouragement anu frequent assistance of the govern
ment, were offered to the Japanese dcsjring to emigrate to
churia. ROGY

re~orts

li~n-

of prospects there were circulated in Japan,

and this Qnd the low transportation rates offered had & material
effect in swelling the tide of emigration. It is known that many
of these emigrants of certain classes, particftlarly tradeFrnen.
were given free trunsport for themselves, and belong:Lngs; the

pr~-

sumption being that where such persons were carried free the gov
ernment in some way cOffi2cnsated the shipping

com~anies. Se~eral

special excursions were made, thousands of so-called students
gi ven a free trip to MEinchuria. end o.pportuni ty to remain the re
if

the~l

wished . Altho some effort was madE; to induce

6.

good cless

of emig-rants to take adYs.ntEige of these oJfers. the average. judg
ing from those seen in

~anchuria

is very poor falling below'the

,~

normal social level in Japan. It is no unfair charge that Japan
has been naking

~!lanchuria ~,s

well as Korea

[l

dumping ground for

her undesjrable elements, and that she has made no good
ion upon the commercial life of the

countI'~/

im~ress-

under consideration,

The chief use to which Japanese shipping companies
'Iyere put was in bringing Japanese goods to T.Ianchuria. These goods
havc been brougut under various conditions. In the beginning it
appears that Japanese traders were charged a low rate of freight
on their merchandise, but even with this help they failed
presper as the governnlent wisp.ed, and showed signs

0

KlK

to

f dis courage

mont. In order to firmly establish Japf.::'1ese commerce on a defini te
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I

basis kmWEZRX steps were taken to give them ftlrther assjstance.
The government called some prominent financiers and merchants
into consultation, and a some what extraordinary program was
advanced. Also there was formed an organ1zation known as the
"Manchuria Export Guild;' for the purpose of directi r.g an ener
getic campaign to monopolize the fOlreign trade of Manchuria.
It included most of the great

co~~eraial

gUilds in Japan, such

as the Osaka Boseki, Miye, Boseki, Kanakin, Seishoku, Teniroa.
Ormomo and the Okayama Boseki. It was announced that the Yoko
hama .:Jpecie Bank, the governrnent's £"isc&l agent in r1anchuria,
was to lend its cooperation. The purpose of Japan respecting
trade in Manchuria was summed .up in four articles as follows:
"Article I.

'rI:e g'overnment to guarantee a loan of

6,000,000 yen at 4 per cent, to be advanced to Japanese mer
cbants doing business in IJanchuria, to assist them in

estab~-,

lishing a trade for Japanese goods.
ItArtjcle},:.
~to

Japanese goods destined. for LanchuriB.

be delivered upon credit under certain
"Article 3.

lirnitatio~s.

The Chinese Eastern Railwa;,y Coopany( south

Manohurian Railway) to carry such goods free, or at one hulf
the usual rate, for one year.
"Article 4.

I.1ari time f'reigh tage :in Jaljanese ships

carryiLg Japanese goode to

~anchuria

to be free. or at one

11

half the usual rate for one year."
:B'eVJ

vlill den, that al tno a government may iegi terns. te

ly unQet'take to a.dvance its natj,onal COP-lJ:lerce by such methods
as are above outlined lind that

altho merchants may be allowed

a rate of interest below normal, the difference must be paid by
some one, and to say that goods are carried free does not mean
that it costa nothing to convey them. It. means, without ques
tion, that those ordinary expenses attenda.nt upon the transac
tion of business temporarily are shifted from certain classes
of the community to others; the presumption being that the cost
of the experiment will be merged into general taxation. Or there
lurks in the project a design in some way to load the cost up
on elements external to the nation.
The Chinese Eastern Railway, mentioned in Article
3, is that part of the south Manchurian Railway. ceded by Rus
sia

to Japan. and extends from an interior point to Dalny and

Newchwang. Altho the railway from Antung and Moukdon was not
stated as being included in the arrangement it iR utilized like
ra.:'lw&;>rs in Japan and Aorea. Thus all of the several routes of
transports. ti on betw'een Japan [;,nd

~~anchurj

a penetrating into this

region, are controlled over their entire length by the govern
ment at Tokio. By these lines goods from Japan can reach the in
terior of Manchuri& lilver four dti'ferent routes, as follows:
(1) By shjps to Port Arthuir or Dalny, and thence by rail to the
inter!or

points~

(2) by'ship to Newchwang, and thence by rail;

( 3) by ship to Antung. and thence

b~T

rail; s.nd

(4)

by ship to

Fusan, and thence by rail to Antung. The railway thru Korea is,
in fact. seldom useQ for this purpose. as water transportation
is usually cheaper tilan
~ince

lan~.

the right of a nation to regUlate its in

ternal affairs is unQuestioned it may not be feasjble for the
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"Family of Nations" to

control the regule tions Japan makes

regarding the operation of ruilways in Korea, assuming that she
is absolute sovereign of the latter. L1' Japan wjshes. in count
ries under her sovereignty, to carry Japanese goods free of
charge, and to impose a heavy tariff on foreign goods, in order
to encourage home industries, she could at most be accused only
of action contrary to the l)rinciples of "International Ethics";
but it is difficult to see just .how international objection can
be made logically, since many states resort to devices fully as
unfair with the same general object. nut Japan's position in
Manchuria is not, in the least, recognized as sovereign; it is
assumed merely to be temporl.;.ry anci preliminary to complete res
toration of the sovereignty of China. It is clear that Japan's
railway interests are on an entirely dij:-ferent basis from those
in Japan and Aorea. In

1~nchuria

her governmental Dlnotions do

not anu should not apply. In many treaties concluded between
China and fore:gn stt:i.tes it is underEtood that railways must
give equal facilities to goods of any nb.tionality. It is further
understood

that no nation should be discriminated against in

favor of another.

~:.ost

observers of the course oi' events in the

Far East during the last ten years will recall John Hayls suc
cessful effort in declaring the "principle of the open door r ••
Ii China and foreign states did not recognize thiS principle we
probably would see a German railway in China favoring products
~~

its tariff rates; a French rajlway carrying French goods

cheaper than british, German and k1€ rican; an English raj l;,-"ay
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giving rebates to Bri tish shippers while charging a straight .
rate to their competitors. Suppose in the United States the
Pennsylvania system gave to German goods a lower rate than to
British, French or Austrian; that the Gould system favored the
British; that the lines controlled by Mr.Hill were owned by the
French Government, which permitted all goods from France to be
carried for less than goods originating in Engle.nd and GerIP.any or
even America. -.Vould not such a condition result in commercial
chaos, to say nothing of possibilities for international friction
growing out of it? John Hay saw what such a situation would moan,
and tried to forstall tendencies toward it in the Far East.
then

can be clearer than that Japanis !)osition

a8

l'~othing

a railway op

erator in tmnchuria is as a corporation, not as a government; and
as a corporation she should be amenable to the lsws and treaties
of China. Japan may operate railways as a government in Japan
and .Korea, but in lLanchuria she should conduct them as
ation.

11

clllrpor
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Chapter 5.
The aims of Japan.

To those who have been watching the trend of
Far Eastern politics and intrigue for the last ten years the
political, and economic aims of Japan ought to be apparent.
Politically she aspires to establishing a hegemony in the
Far East by means of strengthening her military and naval
superiority in the Pacific. Economically in view of the fact
that China,is the richest nation of the whole world in potent
ial wealth and resources she seeks to obtain an exclusive ex
ploi tation, besides acquirtng comr::ercial marKets. Japan is
convinced that b6th aims - political and economic - should go
hand in hand, and each is dependent on the other. Such are, of
course, her fresh ambitions Bnd new outlooks as the result
of the Russo-Japanese war.
Japan, as she told the world in order to en11st
sympathy of the Powers,

~ent

to war agujnst Russia to preserve

the independence of i(orea I to maintain the "open door Tl in
Manchuria, to aSBure the territorial integrity and polit1cal
antonomy of China. Xprea is now annexed to Japan, the "open
door" in Manchuria is olosed tightly'. and Japan I s course in
the last year j,n attempting to brj ng China completely under
her heel

is too recent an event to be forgotten.
Japan IS Buccess in deprjving Germany of' Kjao

Chao was not received with

el~tion

by the Chinese people, but
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instead it waf) received with sPFrehension, becauseto them, the
fall of the leased German terri tory intc the hands of the Japen
ese meant nothing other

thun the Nippon domination of the whole

province of Shangtung. On August 15, when the Tokio
ser.t an Ultimatum to Germany

de~anding

Go~e+nment

the withdrawal

warships from the Far East and the evacuation of

o~

German

Kia~hao,

with

a view to eventually restoring thB territory to her neighbor,
the people in China were very skeptical as to the real purport
of the wording

o~

the Ultimatum, and felt sure that Japan

might have seme ulterior motives.
The pretext of the Japanese in sending the
Ultimatum to Germany, which dETlanded the handing over of X:i.ao
chao to Japan, 'was based upon the fact that

l:;'.

RlID s ian steamship

was captured by German war vessels, thus menacing the peace of
the Far Eo.E- t. I l' tho JalJUneS€ were really upholders of peace
in the Oreint, why did they not adopt a peaceful

~ethod

and be

peaceful herself, by exhorting the Germans not to carry the
way into China Seas, and by deoanding that neither Great

Brit~in

nor }'rance, nor German should. forti fy the leased or ceded t erri- .
tories along China's coast1 Japan took Germanyl s fortifying
Tsingtau as an evidence of the violation of China's neutrali ty;
which incident the Japanese were not slow to utilize in demand
ing its evacuation. But this was not an act of

violation, be

cause fortifying that territory wes one of the terms in the
~

'rreaty between China ar.d Germany in 1898. China though militar
ily weak, need not lean on her neighbor to enforce her neutrality
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especially as this neighbor violates her neutrality at every
turn.Even grantine the propriety of the Japanese demand on
Germany, there

would be more reason in demanding that Germany,

for the present, should restore Kieo-chao to

Chin~,

pending the

final settlement after the war is over, because Tsingtau if; a
le~~ed

may

bpt not a

abroga~eothe

c~ded

territory and the contracting parties

treaty or modify its terms, as occasioned by

circumstances. Japan's violation cf China's neutrality :18 well
known to all, and the world is aware that the Japanese attack on
Tsingt8l;. was Eolely for the l)€nefi t of thei r own people. l\'iany
times their violations of Jhina's neutrality were
we.y in terms of military

r~p,cessity,

expla~ned

a

until their troopB had grad

ually occupied the whole line of °.i:te Kiuochao-Tstnan Railway.
China was only too weak to give her aggress:i ve l-Leighbor a check.
Those who are conversant with Japanese diplomacy
know tOhat Japanese do not take pa1 ns in keepi ng thei r promises.
Their offic ial declaratjoons and terms of treaties are nothing
but scraps of paper.

Jav~n

diu announce that Kiaochao would e

ventually be restored to China Oond did give assuranoes to the
Nashjngton Government about its restoratioD.But when the German
combatants had surrendered and the Japanese were in secure poss
essi on of Ts ingtau thi s was offi C1 all~T deni ed.

7/e

doubted the

sincerity of Japan when the note was sent to Berlin; and Javan's
conduct during the seigo of '[iaochao and after its fall spelled
aloud the doom of 3hangtung Province. It will be remembered that
Japan had rei'used to recognjze China's war zone, and

t~ll ~ler

actions had been taken wjthout any consideration of the zone."
She had carried out her military cperatjons on the aBsunption,
apparently that she might use any part
wished. /.f.;

L

o~

Chinese territory she

r:;a.tter oi.' ::act the war zone was

er had any reason to exist.

futilt~

the Chinese Government

~-\ccorci.ingly

announced. that :i t had been abolished - which i'rom
point of view

-,JUS

and no long

L.

niljtL:.r".)'

to the advantage only of Japan. jUflt as its

establishment had been. But it soon d.eveloped tha.t tho she ha.d
refused to recognize the zone. she would not overlook the fact
that it had been a.holished. 11.. few Japanese soluie rs

rel~Lined

wi thin its boundaries. &.nd it l,'\1as ass1:;'TQeQ that the a.ctj on of

Chjna in abolishing the

zone was a hint

th~t

these soldiers

should be removed,Iil. her attempt to seek a '_luarrel v"i th China.
J'a'pan construed this as a.n insult; ami. the Japanes e press whj, ch
is in close touch with the Foreign Office raged and raved over
the incident, 'and insisted tlu.:.t China pa.y dearly- for

th~"in6p-lttl

and pay at once.
China, alarmed Lt this unexpected development.
immediately cancelled the order a.bolishing the war zone; but this
i"ailed to molljfy Japan, as she had been seeking cause for a
quarrel too long to overlook this opyortunity. The result was
the presentation of the now well-known

de~ands.

which revealed

for the first time the program with which Japanese etatesmen
entered the war. It was the Of),Portune time for Japan IS aggress
ive plans. China

has been protected in the past lareely by the

""Hay Doctri ne tl vihich was agreeci upon by the ~o'Wers. Wi th Eneland,
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France, Germany and Russia fighting in Europe, Japan was left
practi cally a free hand. Germt.my was powerless: Engle_nd I s

h~nds

were full; RusRia was satisfied by a secret agreement with Japan
which gives Russia a free hand in

~1onp.olia;

and France wae too

hard p.ressed at home to pay any attention to affaj.rs in China.
There remnined only the United states, which, tho the origina
tor of the "Open Doorn, is pledged

onl~T

to pacific means to sup

port it. Japan deljberb.tely ignored the many treaties guarantee
ing the Chinese inter,rity and the principle of equal opportuni
tyt by placing on Chin& such demands,

SS,

if &ccepted in fUll.

would have mude her & subject nation of Japan.
The aem&.nO.s were dispatChed on January 18, :.')15,
and during t:lleir ciiscufJsi on, which lasted more then three months
Japan abandoned all pretense of u friendly attitude toward
China

I

aco~pt

who, being both weak in army and ill v~'"

was obliged t.o

a part of the d8mands. Af' a result Japan has unjustly se

cured from China muny valuable rights and privileges which not
only close the commercial door to other nationE, but also threaten
China's freedom as a nation. 'rhc f'ollowjng demands of Japan
have been accepted by the Chinese Government.
(1)
arran~ement

"Chinn agrees in advance to

E'....l3sent

to any

which maiT be arriyed at between Germany and Japan

regarding German rights and concessione in ShangtU1'l3 Province".
In other words Japan seeks to debar China from a hearing at the
peace conference after the vlar. when the disposi tion
tung will be decided.

0

f

Shl:1Il.g
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(2) "Chine agrees not to cede or lease to any Power
any portion of
of foreigners.

Shan~tung

and Eustern Mongolia for the residence

(3)f1The leases of Port Arthur ami Dalny which

were to expire in 1923, are extended to 1997. The lease of the
South Nmnohurian Railraad is extended from 1938 to 2002 and mf the
Antu.ng-Mukden Railroad

to f007". It '"1as possible that China, at

the expiration of these leases would have found it possible to
redeem this property. The new terms put this beyond the possibil
ity of accomplishment or of reeaining her complete sOvereignty in
this generation.
(4)

f1Japanese acquire the right of free resjdence

and travel in South

~~nchur1a,

also the right to lease land for

business and agricultural purposes". This is one of the nost
abominable demands made upon China, for while the Japanese have
£,cquired the right of free residence and that of land ownership
they also retain the right of extra-territoriality. This serves
to extend the Japanese administrative machjnery throughout all
parts of Southern Manchuria, for the residence of a single Japen
ese in a

district of the province gi ves

the Japanese consnls

power over the local police and tax system. By means of the right
of residence and land ovmership Japan is aiming at making south
Manchurja her actual province.
(5) "Japanese subjects are to be allowed to open.
gold, coal, and iron mines in mine

~!stricts

in

!~nchuria.

(6) "Japanese capitalists arc granted a monopoly
in all railroad construction in south

~nchuri&

and Eastern Inner
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Mongolia and in all loans with South Manchurian and Ea.sterm
Inner Mongolian taxes as securjty.
(7) "Je.panese are to be employed by the Chinese
Government as advisers or instructors on political, financial,
military or police matters in South

r~nchuria.

(8)" The complete control of the Kir1n-Changchun

railroad (an important feeder 0::: the South i.ianchuria system)
is given to Japan.
(9}"The Japanese are promised ultimate domination
of the Han Yeh Ping Company (the Krupps of China)T1. Hitherto
there have been quite a

~

numb€r~propesa16

to make this import

ant steel mill a state enterprize. China now pledges herself
in advance to consent to eny agreement for cooperation which
later

ma~r

be reached between Jallanese capitalists and the own

ers of the compc.ny; she agrees not to make the concern a state
enterprise, not to confiscate it, nor to allow it to use any
foreign capital other than Japanese.
flO) "China agrees not to cede or lease any bay,
harbor, or island along the coast of China to Qny Power, and
agrees not to use foreign capital in the construction of a
dqckyard, coaling

s~ation

for military use, or

~

naval base on

the coast of ?ukien province". This term of the agreement

COI!l

pels China to leave the coast line of thi8 important province
defenseless, because at present China is not financially ahle
to carryon construction of this sort without.. the aid of for
~

eign capial.
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The demands, which China did not

aece~t

and will

never accept at any cost, includes:
" (1)

Employment of influential Japanese

as ad

visers to the Chinese Government.

'''tZ) Japanese churches, schools, and hospitals to
be granted the rights of ewnine land in the interior of China.
n(

3) Joint adElinistration by Japanese and Chinese of

the police in important places in China.

"(4) China to purchase fifty per cent or more of her
war munitions from Japan or establish in China a Sino-Japanese
arsenal which is to employ Japanese technical experts ana
chase

pur

Japanese material.
"(5) Japan to have the right to construct railroadS

';.'hich wi th existinr:- li.nes '\vould establish a system from the Wu
Han cities (the location of theiplant of the Han Yeh Ping Company)
with coast outlets at Hangchow and Swatow.
n(6)

A monopoly for Japanese capitalists in the de

velopment of Fukien province.
"(~)

Bud4hism

The right of Japanese missionariee to

propag8~

in China".
Now what do these demands indicate? They indicate

Japan s "Real !1oti ves" - the motives of self' aggra.ndi z.ement at
I

~

the expense of weaker nations. In the case of her occupation of
Manchuria she agreed that it was necessary for her to secure
territory where she could send her surplus popUlation.
false assumptions are, to my

sur~rise,

~hese

accepted almost the world
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over. I t is inco rrect t9 saJ that Japan is overpopulated
a territorial sense. for a l&rge area of the

terlitor~

ir~

of Japan

proper is sparsely populated, and nearly half of the arable.
land of Japan proper is uncultivated.

~vidently

it is not the

lack of land that impels Japanese to emigrate; it is a desire
for economic and commercial betterment. bes1des Manchuria has
long been part of China, and large parts of China are even
more densely populated than Japan. This being so, it should
not be admitted that it is right for Japan to take Hanchuria
(as she did Korea) On that ground. If it comes to right, then
China's right should supersede Japan's, for China1s need for
her own undeveloped possessions is fully as great. If the
legality and etllics of the question are to be considered at
all, then China has a bette r and a fJOre justi fiable clai m.
As can be seen above the iemands of Japan do not
alone relate to Manchuria

and Eastern Mongolia. they also ap

ply to a large part of the country. Through part ownership of
the Hanyehping Coal and Iron Company she hopes to control
China's greatest industrial undertaking and to provide against
her own dearth of iron iron one of the greatest. if not the
greatest, deposits of iron-ore don the world. 'l'hru thj s pe.rtial
control ehe seeks to dominate nothing leES than China's supply
of war aElmuni tion, which she prOVides herself when she needs
it. Japan demends the valiCiation of an entirely new sphere of
interest in
constituted

~lkien,

opposjte

For~osa

- her island colony, which

part of her booty in 1095, as u result of her vic
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tOTy in t he Chino-Japanese war. And from t he mines and i'oundar"
ies in Centl'l.::.l China to her prospective
this province

~he

l!

sphere of inte re s t" in

demands a new systen of railways cutting thru

the heart of the British trade-belt and !1special concession
preserve" south of the Yang-tse River.
In general the u>manda of Japan mean t:ilit she
intends: (1) to convert the prov1nce of Shangtung into a Japan
ese sphere of influence, i2) to m&ke South Manchuria and Eastern
IJongolia Japanese provincee;. (3) to ObtRin a monopoly of the
vast mineral wealth of the Yangtse

11

of China.'s war munition, th p81ic:!m.g

01"

(4) to gain control
important Chinese terri

tory and an upper hand in the control of

~hinals

political, mil-

i tary and financial 'affairs. She was merely making haste to se
cure in ad\Tance what she might be unable to get if she waited
till the war vwas over. She

see~-;:s

to eXliand not at the eXi)enSe

of China alone, but at the expense of every power as well. It
is said . . tha t in Southern IE.anChUrialfhe flBri tish and American
trade has been steadily declining ever since §hat part of China.
passed under Japanese control. It has been driven out in a great
part by Japanese

co~petit:on,

supported by preferential customs

and railway rates, shil?ping bounties, and successful resistance
to paying China's internal taxes. Japan's methods constitute not
onlY a violation of the "open door" principle but also e. !.f)ost
serious transgression of the principles of international ethics
and morality, for her competition takes the form of 'a system of
rebates, not only in freight and steamer rates, but in

r~mission

~

o~

duties and chQrges which are assessed against all other

nations.
The same procedure is
~sing-tao. ~he

be~ng

rapidly re-enacted at

prerogatives of the Ger.mans are being increased

and eccentuatcd by thE Japanese. Where the Germans used Chinese
currenc~r

and the Chinei:oe langtl.Gge the Japanese have rigidlY. in

sisted on their

o~~.

bout a hundred

German employees, and the rest Chinese, hus been

entirely

by Japanese.

manne~

I

Ue~~n-Chinese

a:rc the e

SUC~1

the 1<"ar East

The

railroad. with only a

lea of' thc Japanese peri 1 in

wili ch sooner or later will affect even the whole

civilized world.
she exyects large

Jup~n's

participation 1n the war means that

~ompensation.

In other words it means that

the Allies. having no assets to give Japan that would be worth
anything to her, might, as the Japanese statesmen see it. allow
her to take her chief pay fron China. T.Ioreover Japan well knows
that China is a peace-loving nation. and
she will keep peace at any" cost.

seems to be sure that

The latter does not necessar

ily folloVl in Chinars attitude toward Japan; for, altho the
Chinese love peace, they are not cowards. As a last resort China
will do all within her power to resist injustice and Japan's
enc~oachrnent upon her 8.utonom.l and terri torial integrity. I f this

be Dot true, why are "the ordinary run of the Chinese people so
profoundly hloved that in a single week in .:"ebruE.ry 1915, as
many

~s

twent~-five

hundred telegrams were received by the Gov

ernment in rekin from hundreds of provincial. town::: and.

s~E..ll

villages . in every part of t he republic, urging China to put tlJ.B
last ounce of her energy into Withstanding the demands of Japan?"
The view of China is best expressed in the blunt words of Liang
Chi-Chao,. a Chinese statesman; TIThe guilt of Belgium is that she
failed to follow the example of Luxemburg; the guilt of China is
that she has failen to follow the example of Korea--------If ahe
shall force us to the last resort, it will be better if we are
shattered into fragrants as a piece of je.de than that we shall
keep ourselves together as a pjece of hrick

rt

•

Last, China has stood for peace for ages, and by her
love of: peace has contrj.buted to the future welfare ot" the world
more than any other nation. "The one great

nation~'

s@.ys Harding,

"whose potentialities for peace in the hour when she should have
influence and respect throughout the world are
profound, she should not be cut off

fro~

unquestionable and

those vital opportunities.

now when the world is seeing at last how greatly desirable is a
civilization

co~nitted

by every agency possible against the horrors

o.±" another ereat war. To the int£rest of i'air •play isboined
f

the

interest of peace; and. both are bound up for the world in the pre
servation of the integrity of China ugainst W.l:10See'ler shall assail
'''''il

l '"

•

Foot-notes.
Part II.

1

Chapter 5.

The term of fortificati.on reads. f:Germany engages
to construct, at a suitable moment on the territory
thus leased. fortifications for the ptotection 0 the
buildings to be constructed there lind of the entrance
ta the harbor". See treaty between China and. Germany
respecting the Lease of Kiaochao to Germany. Sect~on
I. Art. II., Hertslet's China Treaties, Vol.I.
pp.351.

" The terms of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance d.eclares as
one of its objects: "The preservation of the oommon
interest of all rowers in China by insuring the inde
pendence and integrity of China. and. the principle of
eoual opportunity for the commerce and industry of all
nations in Chi.na. In the .AmE'rican Ja.panese understand
ing of 1908 the fourth article reads: " They (Japan and
the United states) are also determined to preserve the
common interests of all powers in China, by su~porting
b¥ all specific means a.t their disposal. the independ
ence and i ntegri ty 0 f China and the principle of e'lHal
opportun~yY for commerce and indus~~¥ of all nations in
that empire".
'.'farld's Work. Septer-lbe:&.· lY15.
pp.533-534.
3

World's ':lork.

Septe~ber.

1915.

pp.534-536.

4 The coast of Fuk:t en cc.n be reached in a few hours from
the Japanese colony of Formosa.
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